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SUMMARY
The aim of the dissertation is to explore the notion of 
explanation in political philosophy, given that political philosophy 
concerns political things, acts and concepts. Features of explanation 
are outlined with special emphasis on organisation of experience leading 
to understanding; and include interpretative, expository, ordering, 
and insight-providing elements. The political sphere is outlined, which 
provides the subject matter of explanation, by reference to the Socrates/ 
Plato watershed in early Greek thought; and characterised by its concern
with order in diversity, patterns, public activity and the search for the
)
good life. It is a created sphere and encompasses autonomous activity, 
thereby admitting the possibility of philosophy in politics. It contains 
various sorts of explanation, among them explanation of human action. 
Consideration of this leads to a discussion of the relation of theory 
to action, of action to values, and of epistemology to political 
philosophy itself. The latter provokes an attack on the customary 
dichotomy between fact and value. The act concept is examined and leads 
to a discussion of symbolism and other important examples of explanation 
in political philosophy; myth, political space and time, paradigms and 
tradition, which are expounded with reference to the presocr'atic Greeks, 
Herbert Read’s educational theories, and Michael Oakeshott’s work 
respectively; Finally a summary of points emerging from the exploration 
is presented, pointing out the link between matters of fact and political 
philosophy, from which the need for explanation springs.
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INTRODUCTION
"Political things (acts and concepts) are not only real, but 
taken in a broad sense, they constitute the most secure zone of our 
experience, being even more secure than sense perception, or at least 
as real: they are sufficiently real to make us happy or sad, to get
us killed or permit us to live."
S. H. Rosen.
This dissertation is about political things, the concern of 
political philosophy. In particular it investigates our explanation 
of the phenomena we find or place in the sphere of the political, and 
it goes back to the presocratic philosophers, to find out how these things 
were put in that sphere.
Explanation is only one of the activities covered by political 
philosophy, but it is an important one because it results from the 
picture we have of a particular political society, and it is one of the 
most important ways of attending to "the eternal problem of order" that 
has fascinated political philosophers since the presocratic Greeks.
CHAPTER I.
E X P L A N A T I O N
Explanation is a generic concept. It varies with its subject 
matter in an orderly way, because it is connected with understanding.
Explanation is one of the processes that goes on in political/, 
philosophy, but explanation is always of something. It is a directed 
activity in that it works from a given: a matter of fact; an experience
a state of affairs; through a construction we call the explanation itself, 
to produce understanding, either*in the actor dm in the listener. If 
the explanation is written down, the listener may be as yet unborn. When 
he reads it, some time in the future, his purpose will be the same as the 
present -reader: he will be hoping to increase his understanding of the
problem it tackles.
But explanations, to stop talking in capital letters, come in 
many guises. A nod of the head to the right person at the right moment 
may convey more than a treatise, but considered as an explanation, it is 
too context-bound to be counted philosophical. To earn this label it 
must at least be general. Furthermore a philosophical explanation must 
be put in a public form. Usually it is written down. It may remain 
only in verbal formulation but it is then at the mercy of memory and bias, 
and its availability is limited.
Wanting to trace the origins of explanation, philosophers, 
psychologists and historians, have picked out demonstration as one of its 
earliest forms. The most stupid onlooker can pick up practical skills, 
and the relation between physical objects by watching an action often 
enough. Abstract ideas, and concepts are much more difficult. Here 
verbal explanation is needed, but:' for there to be communication, as opposed 
to mere speech, between demonstrator and recipient, there must be a common 
basis of experience and knowledge from which they can work.
I do not mean merely that they must both speak the same language. 
Indeed they could communicate even if each understood not a word of the
other's tongue, but unless they have relevant common experience, the 
explanation will never achieve its end. It would be no good explaining 
to a Martian with no eyes, the function of a pair of sunglasses. With no 
reference for 'sight','what sense could he make of a device to prevent 
discomfort caused by glare? Or to take a less fantastic example, it would 
be pointless to describe youremotional response to a glowing Van Gogh canvas 
in reply to the question "what makes this picture great?" asked by someone 
who was colour blind. They might suggest tactile or aural analogies, 
but these would have to be ratified by you.
Imagination also could help here, but it can only bridge little gaps. 
Things that are fundamentally outside our experience cannot be explained 
to us, though some of their flavour may be conveyed by forceful metaphor. 
However, for the purposes of this inquiry, we may assume common access to 
a wide area of experience. It is addressed only to earth men in the common 
use of the term and not to Martians, men in the moon, or horses.
Is the form of explanation in political philosophy affected by 
its subject matter, or, does it, on the contrary determine its own subject 
matter? To put the question another way, given an explanation, granted 
it meant something to us, how could we tell if it was at the same time, 
political philosophy? At first glance it seems that the form the inquiry 
takes, makes it philosophical, determines the kind of questions asked; 
whilst the content makes it political. That looks very simple, but it 
needs to be unpacked.
V/e have suggested above the one feature of philosophical inquiry 
is its generality. B. C. Parekh (l) outlines four others important to 
the connection between politics and philosophy. By his definition of 
philosophy he means "a radically and self-consciously critical interpretation 
of the nature of any phenomenon one happens to be inquiring into."
This implies that a philosophical inquirer must ask the most • 
basic questions that can be asked, never being content to assume things 
on another authority. In theology or science, for example, the field is 
predetermined, in that only a certain sort of phenomenon, or kind of 
explanation is admitted. It is this that gives the inquiry its character.
But the philospher cannot be content with assumptions. His aim is to 
remove all presuppositions, and to achieve it his work must be continuously 
self-critical. A physicist may be happy and productive given a certain 
picture of the electron. The philosopher must question its ontological 
status. The theologian may use arguments based on the existence of an 
all powerful, ineffable Being, whose edicts are law. The philosopher 
must turn over the arguments, evidence and the implications of this sort 
of belief, and indeed the ejaaisiemological status of such a belief in itself.
All this is not to say that a philosopher qua man cannot also be 
a scientist, or a believer in God. However, when he acts as chemist or 
Christian, he is not doing philosophy.
Parekh goes on to point out that philosophy is a fully self-conscious 
inquiry. At the same time that it investigates its subject matter, it 
evaluates the investigation that it is performing. In case this should 
sound like a snake swallowing its own tail, this point arises only because 
philosophical inquiry can inquire into philosophical inquiry. The process 
is in itself a discrete activity.
Moreover it is a critical activity. Recently this characteristic 
has been challenged. People have suggested that philosophical inquiry 
plays a descriptive or clarificatory role. But whereas most philosophers 
have challenged the credentials of some activity, or of the prescriptive 
picture of an activity painted by some other philosopher (and nowhere more 
consistently than in political philosophy) they have often done so, to 
replace it by some scheme of their own. It is part of philosophy1s 
dialectical nature that this scheme is in its turn open to criticism. By 
publishing it, its author invites criticism. He himself has -evaluated 
what it contains. He v/ishes to be associated with it. But the enterprise 
of philosophy takes a wide stage and many actors. Criticism of activity 
or inquiry must logically itself invite criticism.
Besides the logical point, Parekh makes an interesting comment 
on the role of understanding, a matter we have seen closely connected v/ith 
explanation. In his article (3) he states ".... philosophers traditionally 
have argued, and could not but argue, that the concepts one employs embody
one's understanding, and that a different -understanding necessarily calls 
for different concepts and thus for conceptual revision. To philosophise 
is to offer a certain kind of understanding and obviously the way one 
sees and interprets an activity determines, among other things, the 
concepts one employs, the words one uses and the way one relates them."
It seems that the question of form and content is not clear 
cut, but rather a matter of relation, form and content in some way 
determining one another. And this is the gist of Parekh*s final point 
about the definition of philosophy. He maintains that it is inter­
pretative. In the particular article I am quoting, Parekh* s remarks 
are addressed to readers of Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott contends, he 
says, that explanation is the most important feature of political 
philosophy, but this is not so. It cannot be considered logically 
ultimate, because it depends initially, on how one interprets the 
phenomena. Since the -ultimate concern in enquiry of this sort is to 
understand, it is necessary to offer an interpretation, not just an 
explanation.
To this end, we start off with chaos or multiplicity, (this is 
what we call experience), and at the same time with the need or desire 
to resolve chaos, and reduce the multiplicity to order, we must probe 
to a deeper level than that of phenomenon to provide it, i.e. to levels 
of analysis and reduction. Although the process of description 
ultimately involves interpretation, in that one must first select the 
significant factors from the chaos of experience the dlement of inter­
pretation is minimal. Interpretation in contrast to description is 
concerned with understanding not identification.
The outline of interpretation Farekh presents is intended as 
a critique of Oakeshott*s notion of explanation. But we have defined 
explanation more widely from the start, and our wider definition includes 
an element of interpretation that is, if the aim of explanation, the 
necessary aim, since without it explanation cannot be defined or grasped, 
is to produce understanding, then Parekh's objection connot be applied 
to our definition. Indeed it only illuminates our original point. 
Bot^interpretation, and explanation as we use it, in this dissertation 
involve understanding.
These observations on philosophy are mainly about the form 
of questions asked* What about the content of these questions?
The nature of the sphere of the political is discussed at length in the 
next section. It is of great importance when touching on political 
philosophy. But political activity must itself fulfil certain conditions 
before it can be the subject of a philosophical inquiry. It must at 
least be autonomous and distinctive. Why is this? Parekh (4) true 
to his own scheme here outlines four fundamental assumptions that are 
made when we talk of anything being an activity.
Firstly, when you ask questions about the activity it must 
not resolve itself into something else. Then it must be capable of 
being fruitfully studied in terms appropriate to itself. These must be 
logically related to one another in a way that they are not related to 
others, and finally, together they must constitute a complex that has a 
certain degree of internal unity and homogeneity. Political activity 
"the conduct of the collective affairs of a territorially organised 
community” (5) fulfils these four conditions. Or to sum up in Parekh1 s 
own words (p. 159)
"the possibility of political philosophy requires that political 
activity should be distinguishable from non-political activities like 
religion or economics, and an adequate view of it requires that it should 
not be identified with any single aspect of politics. Only by drawing 
these distinctions is it possible to define political philosophy in terms 
that do not Confuse it with, among other things, social, moral, economic 
or religious philosophy on the one hand, and the philosophy of the state 
or legal, civil, or legislative philosophy on the other."
There are other standpoints from which to foray into political 
philosophy. One obvious one is to tackle the question historically and 
see what has been written on the subject, and considered to be political 
inquiry to date. Here we are again faced with problems of interpretation, 
this time akin to those facing the historian. What survives is generally 
what has been considered important at the time, by those who then had 
power to enforce their opinions. They in turn were influenced by 
contemporary happenings, wars, revolutions and tides of public feeling 
being among the more important, and once the selection was made, little 
could be done to change it.
Even supposing all this pre-selection could somehow be reversed 
(and the status of what would then appear, would be somewhat curious) 
there is still the logical possibility that everyone so far might have 
been wrong about what tssy called the political sphere, so that their
attempts at political philosophy were foredoomed to failure.........or
is there?
Surely this will not do. What people choose to call the 
political is the political in some sense. Or rather, what people choose 
to see as political becomes the political by being treated in the manner 
appropriate to the political. Even then the choice is not entirely 
arbitrary. If it hadnno fixed limits, we would be able to include 
anything, literally anything in this sphere, which is nonsense, and 
besides contravenes one of Parekh1s defining characteristics of activity.
It follows that we must have some idea of the sphere of the
political before we begin. It has a basis in our experience which we
can share and communicate to others. But this does not necessarily 
mean that we find it already made in the outside world, or that it is 
straightforwardly ’given’ to us. Nor does the opposite, that we make 
it ourselves follow. Rather the truth lies somewhere between the two.
We can get nearer to it by considering for a moment a much bigger question, 
namely what do we mean by experience?
Experience is one of a number of primitive concepts from which 
the philosopher can choose to work (he will probably be called an idealist 
if he does). It is in some way ’given’ to us as subjects. The notion
of subject depends on there being some sort of experience for him to be
subject of. The ideas of a subject and its objects are complementary, 
because the subject is that which experiences, whilst the object is that 
which is experienced. So, subject, object experience: if we want to
talk about our world we must start with these three.
But the subject may experience in a variety of ways. Taking 
a description of man as a sentient being, a condition of his being in the 
world, is that he is aware. But there are many ways of being aware, of 
experiencing.
Our primary experience is a jumble which always contains more 
than we can picture in words, conceptual schemes or even works of art.
This is the force of much of Merlean-Ponty's work on perception(6).
He used the notion of the pre-logical and pre-linguistic sphere to 
explain many puzzling features of ordinary perception. In a simplified 
picture we may envisage ourselves, through our openings on the world, 
eyes, ears, mouth, imagination, fingers etc. soaked in a storm of 
perceptions. If we did nothing to organise them we would drown or 
remain imbeciles, because without organisation, we cannot understand 
them, and understanding is the basis of control.
So, to borrow a simile from Russell, we quickly don a pair 
of mental spectacles which enable us to perform selective focussing.
They might be science spectacles or poetry spectacles or history spectacles, 
to pick out but three. This reduces the chaos and enables us to come 
to grips with part of what is impinging on us.
But this picture is rather too simple, because we don't necessarily 
cut out part of our experience by viewing it from a particular standpoint.
We still see all of it, but from one perspective. We could say we switch 
on a conceptual spotlight which illuminates certain things and leaves 
others in the shadows. Such a "manner of thinking which tries to explain
experience of all kinds in the most coherent and comprehensive way,
and to reveal the logic immanent in this experience" (8) is a form of
idealism, and has been particularly associated with Hegel and his
followers•
Michael Oakeshott (9) has produced a persuasive schematisation 
of this sort in which he outlines four main ways of systematizing 
experience, called activities. These four participate in a ’conversation 
of mankind’, i.e. not playing any fixed role, they intermingle with now 
one predominating, now another. It is implied that if one voice 
predominates, the conversation as a whole suffers. The four 'modes of 
experience* Oakeshott has so far concentrated on are activities practical, 
scientific, poetic and historical.
Politics is part of practical activity which "takes in everything 
concerning the change and maintenance of existence" and is distinguished
by its instability. It is instructive to note what Oakeshott has 
to 0ay about the origins of activity, because if activity could be 
characterised, we might have some sort of answer to the question of 
the limits of political activity, which we touched on earlier.
"Activities emerge" says Oakeshott, (10) "naively, like 
games that children invent for themselves. Each appears, first, not 
in response to a premeditated achievement, but as a direction of attention 
pursued without premonition of where it will lead. How should our artless 
ancestor have known what (as it has turned out) it is to be an astronomer, 
an accountant, or an historian. And yet it was he who, in play, set our 
feet on the paths which led to these, now narrowly specified actions.
For, a direction of attention, as it is pursued, may hollow out a 
character for itself and become specified as a 'practice1; and a 
participant in the activity comes to be recognised not by the results he 
achieves but by his disposition to observe the manners of the 'practice'. 
Moreover, when an activity has acquired a certain firmness of character, 
it may present itself as a puzzle, and thus provoke reflection; for 
there may come a point at which we not only wish to acquire and exercise 
the skill which constitutes the activity, but we may also wish to discern 
the logic of the relation of this activity it has come to be specified 
to others and to ascertain its place on the map of human activity."
The weakness in such a definition of activity is the assumption 
that it can have 'sprung' from artless play, for then it would contain 
no notion of purpose, one of the distinguishing features of activity.
The astronomer or historian Oakeshott talks about, (or, we might add, 
the politician) became differentiated from our'artless ancestor' precisely 
when he became aware of an aim and directed his play towards that end.
It is by an end that we characterise an activity. Both an 
astronomer and an historian may look through a telescope - but according 
to their purposes they see different things. Both an historian and an 
astronomer may read an account of a seventeenth century uprising, but 
they read different things. What they do can be described fully only 
by taking into account the aim with which they do it, and it is this 
factor that Oakeshott omits.
Other writers have produced similar metaphysics. John
MacMurray (ll) concentrates on Religion, Art and Science. These are
hierarchically arranged, religion encompassing art and science, and 
each denoting categories of characteristic human experience. Michael 
Polanyi (12) also has a hierarchical system of much greater complexity, 
based on experience.
But in differentiating between kinds of activity, as Oakeshott1s 
formulation of the problem of categorisation has led us to do, there 
are logical factors which must not be forgotten. Yet, in considering 
experience as a whole the question is to establish the metaphysical 
basis from which these logical differences arise. It is here that 
political philosophy can contribute to political activity by asking 
questions about political ontology, e.g. what are the ultimate features 
of political activity in terms of which various forms of it can be 
explained? because "Depending on how one analyses the structure and 
manner of existence of the political community, one suggests different 
criteria of political identity, and offers different philosophical 
interpretations of civil war and revolution." (13)
A further contribution is made by political epistemology 
which consists of an analysis of the categories of the political condition. 
It is in this area that we find some of the most powerful political 
explanations, and much of what follows springs from epistemological 
questions.
If we seem to have strayed a long way from experience, 
it has been to try to connect this treatment of explanation in political 
philosophy with wider philosophical issues.
Returning now to the notion of an explanation in political 
philosophy, we may ask what are the formal requirements, and what is it, 
for something to be considered a political explanation. We have historical 
sanctions to look on politics itself as an activity concerned with order 
of a particular kind; the kind that is in the widest sense concerned 
with the arrangements of a group of people living in a territorially 
based association, and acts through the medium of government.
Look at Hobbes1 political philosophy in this light. (14)
His central concern was the safety of the state. Since man*s.nature 
was such that he could not live peaceably with man if left to his own 
devices, we must be rescued from destructive anarchy by the imposition 
of one will on what was an unruly mass rent with personal feuds. This 
one will, embodied in the sovereign could and would create order out of -■ 
chaos.
Plato’s vision of the good society is also based on order but 
here the order springs from the very nature of an ideal form and the 
society he aims at is a static one; change, to Plato being necessarily 
change for the worse. Aristotle and Augustine worked in a framework of 
order when writing on politics, though it sprang from a different 
source for each.
One of the tasks of explanation in political philosophy 
therefore, is to make the possibilities of order apparent. This does 
not mean starting with a clean slate and describing fanciful patterns.
The philosophy possible must take due account of the activity it inquires 
into, and political matters were ever in a state of flux. Rather 
philosophical explanation serves to draw out the strands of experience 
amenable to manipulation and explore and evaluate possible arrangements 
within the political sphere.
It might for instance investigate the connections between 
education and society by producing a model of the relation between them 
e.g. seeing society as an educational matrix and identifying the social 
pressures that go to mould the individual. If this model is accepted 
as a form of explanation, it may well have political repercussions in that 
recommendation about the kind of social action needed to provide the best 
sort of education can take plane only when certain political conditions 
are set up. The institutions of a particular society may need re­
arrangement, or people may have to be deployed from one job to another, 
retraine d and so on.
There are all kinds of hidden value premises in an argument 
such as this one, here indicated in a very abbreviated form. But 
assuming that these would also be exposed by philosophical investigation,
explanation, in the form of a tentative model, could serve to make 
the possibilities or order apparent.
Another function of political explanation is interpretation 
of political facts. Remember we are using explanation in a wide sense, 
to include the notion of interpretation, since it is directed towards 
understanding. Order is again important here. The breakdown of order 
is one way to see a crisis in society or govermeriti, and there are other 
situations usefully viewed as attempts to impose, or reach order.
Perhaps in a revolutionary context this particular explanatory model 
has many ramifications directly relevant to political activity; as we 
shall see.
Besides order, the outstanding example of a political explanation, 
other conceptual devices are used to good effect, and are investigated 
in the following sections. Metaphors are employed to explain political 
facts, and we find several that recur so often that we can safely look 
for a very close connection with their subject matter. Tradition is a 
notion beloved of political philosophers. It is a way of viewing the 
whole field of politics in a historical context, but does not necessarily 
give us a historical explanation.
To see tradition as an explanatory device, consider the trio 
experience, explanation (or interpretation), understanding. Experience 
we have argued is to some extent chaotic. We can grasp that it is 
happening to us but as soon as we focus on part of it, we are interpreting 
it. If we did not do this, we would remain imbeciles or be over­
whelmed. So we use a conceptual scheme to grasp it. We take up a 
stance and view our experience from this perspective, and this we do in 
order to understand it. Thus there is a tripartite relation experience: 
explanation: understanding. Tradition is a conceptual device belonging 
to the second term in this relation; experience. If we try to talk 
of ’a tradition1, not a specific tradition, but'a tradition1, abstract 
noun, we face grave difficulties, but examples of traditional 'this* and 
traditional ’that' are all around us. Tradition, like metaphor, 
providesexplanation in political philosophy.
In all this we are not talking about carrying on politics
itself, though we are not denying that political philosophy may have 
practical repercussions. (it is possible to argue, as Parekh does, 
that it must have such repercussions). But if we are to make a 
philosophical inquiry, description, explanation or anything else, it 
must be clear, what the subject matter of this inquiry consists in.
So the uses of philosophical explanation are similar to those 
of ordinary explanation, which are:-
(i) to make things clearer
(il) to examine the extent and implication of
existing explanations.
(ill) to provide insights into its subject matter 
(iY) and in general to provide understanding.
(IV) we recognise as the most important point and one of its 
implications is that explanation is generic, i,e, embraces many species.
J. Yhlton has pointed out in an article in British Journal for the (15) 
Philosophy of Science that the connection between explanation and 
understanding is often overlooked, and he wishes to argue that what
makes e.g. scientific explanation, scientific, is not its form (deductive)
but its subject matter. This we take to be rather too simple a view, 
since form of explanation and subject matter to some extent determine 
one another, at any rate when explanation is taken in the wide sense of 
necessity to include interpretation.
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CHAPTER II 
T H E  P 0 L I T I C  A L S P H E R E
To pick out explanation in political philosophy we must he 
able to identify the area of the political, or we will not know what 
we are trying to explain.
To investigate explanation in political philosophy we must 
first solve a two-tiered problem. We have to outline the area of 
the political, which involves characterising political activity; and 
then decide what a philosophical inquiry into this activity will involve, 
or indeed whether such an inquiry is possible.
Characterising political activity is by no means easy, even 
though political 'this1, 'that', and 'the other' are common currency 
in everyday life. Newspapers and other mass media are bombarding us 
all the time with images of political activity and its results. If 
we ourselves decide on a course of action, we sometimes experience these 
results at first hand, but more often as part of something else, which 
does not strike us as political in the least; for instance little Johnny' 
arithmetic.
Little Johnny has been having trouble with his sums. Perhaps, 
suggests his progressive Father, he would do better at a school where 
newer methods of teaching are used. Perhaps, suggests his more practical 
Mother, he is unhappy at school because he can't hear very well, or is 
short sighted? Let's go and talk to the teacher about it. But just 
then the teacher goes on strike, about a pay claim, or about using 
untrained helpers in the classroom. Little Johnny's parents are filled 
with righteous indignation, when his teacher is not there for them to 
talk to. "Shouldn't let politics interfere with doing her proper job" 
they complain. "VJhy isn’t she where she ought to be, teaching our little 
Johnny?"
But what if anxious Mama takes little Johnny to have his ears or 
eyes tested? It is a relatively easy procedure and will cost her nothing 
unless he does need to wear glasses. What made this possible? Some
politics somewhere along the line. It was surely a political decision 
of somebody to set up health and welfare services for the community, 
financed largely by contribution from that community?
So it seems that politics as we know it is very much interwoven 
with our everyday life. It might, in that case, prove easier to get 
a clear picture of it, if we go back to its origins. We can then 
decide how much or how little it has changed and bring our ideas up to 
date accordingly.
It can be argued, and indeed I shall argue in a later section 
(Chapter IV) that political philosophy has its temporally ultimate 
and expressed sources in the thinking of the presocratics. But as a 
distinct mode of activity, politics and political philosophy are just 
clearly recognisable at the watershed that is Socrates/Plato.
For in Socrates and Plato the sense of politics as a game among 
other:-games is lost. Systematisation becomes the thing, and must be 
carried out with deadly seriousness. This constitutes a watershed in 
political thought recognised and expounded variously by writers since 
that time. Their views differ, but they are united in seeing Plato's 
work, (especially the 'Republic') as of the utmost significance for the 
emergence of political philosophy.
Eric Havelock is one of these writers. He sees a fundamental 
change in the nature of political philosophy after Plato has lived.
The change involves choosing one set of possibilities and ignoring 
another. The set of possibilities chosen is usually called the classical 
tradition.
Havelock (l6) attempts to categorise man’s thought about himself.
He sees Greek thinkers, especially dramatists and poets, wrestling with 
the 'given* of the human condition, the subject matter with v/hich they 
constructed plays and dramas. The given is what they were attempting to 
portray and to come to grips with, to make manageable by making it 
understandable. As such their task is difficult because the human 
condition contains a paradox (expressed by Sophocles in Oedipus Tyrannus') 
that the human species is subject to chance, yet intelligent, biologically 
limited, yet creative.
It is from this paradoxical starting point that man, in 
his wondering, theorises: and it is to the same paradox tha/t he returns. 
For in it is expressed the ultimate thing he knows about himself qua man. 
To know what man is, the paradox must be accounted for, the riddle solved
There is more than one solution, and Havelock contents himself 
with the two he considers historically dominant. One solution gives 
us the 'idealist' tradition, exemplified by Plato and Aristotle. The 
other is reached by a group of presocratic philosophers whom Havelock 
terms the anthropologists: Anaximander, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus 
Democritus.
The difference in views between the classical and the 
anthropological theorists lies in a difference of opinion about the 
nature of man. Plato's works assume that man has always existed in 
his present form or character: he either came into being able to speak,
intelligent, morally aware and so on, or he was created so by God.
Either way his spiritual nature is assured, by being part of what it 
means to be a man. That is to say, this view of the origin of man rests 
on metaphysical foundations.
The non-metaphysical view derives from a historical science 
which postulates the'■ evolution of man from non-human life forms.
Thus moral and social codes follow the emergence of intelligence and 
speech. Civilization is here an essentially historical'.process and 
"can be viewed as both moulding man and being moulded by man" (17) •
We may call these two views the religious-metaphysical, and the 
biological-historical for brevity.
Whatever we may think of this interpretation of Greek history, 
it does lead to some exciting developments when we move from thd 
historical to the political sphere. Havelock argues that in the West 
morality and lav; are seen as resting on principles whose validity is 
independent of time, place and circumstance. They are accounted for 
either as inherent in the structure of the universe, or as the result of 
divine will. In Plato and Aristotle these principles originate in the 
ideal forms of justice and goodness.
"The united influence of Classic Greek philosophy and 
religious revelation built up the conviction that man has an unchanging 
spiritual nature which is either itself the source or is created by the 
source, of a moral law both timeless and complete". (18)
This is the timeless Eden Myth: the view of man's history
which starts with a fall from Grace, so that even with the help of 
God, man is for ever climbing back up, trying, in vain to regain something 
he has lost. Contrast it with the conception of human behaviour 
held by the fifth century anthropologists - that replaces principles 
with conventional patterns of behaviour, the rules of a game by which 
man finds it convenient to live; and not only are we back with 
Anaxagoras, but the rules of morals and law have only 'aposteriori' 
validity. No objectivity can be claimed for them.
This 'human science' outlook also differs from the Eden myth 
in the kind of pattern accounting for the emergence of civilisation. 
Eschewing the fall from grace it sees rather a long climb upwards.
But this is to assume that human development is a positive thing without 
postulating the terms in which anything could be considered good or bad.
It seems to make nonsense of the idea of choice, yet leaves us with the 
absurdity of having to make choices. It is akin to existentialist 
thought at its most dismal.
However it can be made to make sense, if as in Anaxagoras, 
ordering in any sense of the word - structuring, building, arranging - 
is regarded as a game. We have then only to look hard enough and we 
will discern the rules. From then on we can start playing. This is 
the very temper of Heidegger's philosophy, with the game played out in 
the shadow of the largest forfeit of all, death, which affects how we play 
but cannot affect the rules setting up the game.
The sum of such a view of man is what Havelock terms the 'liberal 
temper in Greek politics, which as it emerges can, he says, be traced 
in Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripedes. In fact at times his theory 
would seem more relevant to literary criticism than to a theory of 
politics, if he did not draw out the political consequences of such a 
position. They are, in a word, opposition to the idealism and 
authoritarianism inherent in Plato.
Plato, you see, took the anthropologists' notions, and 
stood them on their head. He reinforced idealistic and teleological 
notions of man as he was bound to do if he was to postulate an ideal 
world of Forms, to which man was to aspire through philosophy.
Political theories can thus be categorised according to the kind of 
goals they set up, which vail in turn influence the degree^ , authoritarianism 
needed to run any particular state on their particular lines. Havelock 
assumes that theories postulating external goals or incentives, i.e. the 
attainment of some higher state; necessarily contain people who will 
claim, rightly or wrongly to have privileged access to information 
about this state, and who will thereby claim a larger share of obedience 
from the unenlightened mass. If this were so, it would indeed lead to 
author!tariani sm•
But he neglects the possibility that authoritarianism may 
result in a state subscribing also to the beliefs of the anthropologists. 
Here the forces brought to bear are likely to be more subtle. They 
may be forces of conservatism or of self interest, but insofar as they 
are theoretically discoverable by all, perhaps such a compromise state 
is the most desirable one. It is more difficult to defend from subtle 
attacks originating in the supposedly enlightened seekers after truth 
themselves: existentialism is exhausting, and as Fromm has pointed
out (19) freedom may be rejected by those people it would most benefit.
Moreover, although these two strands, the idealist and the 
anthropological both have existed in Greek thought, the reason they 
have not both been recognised before seems to be more a function of 
what we were ready for than a case of big bad Plato. The theory of 
evolution shocked and incensed our Victorian great-grandparents.
By bringing in presocratic Greek anthropologists, Havelock may gust 
be continuing the attempt to make Darwinism respectable. Nonetheless, 
insofar as he points out even the possible existence of a second 
tradition of political thought in Greek times, he enables us to contrast 
the two and begin to characterise some of the assumptions of political 
activity which concerned Plato.
Perhaps we would reach the heart of the matter if w<a considered 
what the Greeks were trying to do when they sought to organise their
knowledge of man's nature. Surely in organising, they were trying 
to "underpin the chaos of their experience", (20) trying to understand, 
to render their experience intelligible, a role assigned by Frankfort 
to Myth. This was not a straightforward task.
John Gunnell (2l) sees it as a jerky process. The early 
thinkers would see how some part of their experience was gradually 
becoming too complicated to fit into a simple overall mythic explanation, 
and break it off to look at more closely, so to speak. In this context 
he also has something to say about Plato's position as a political 
philosopher: in fact the first truly political philosopher. Plato’s
importance ’was that he broke off a large piece of experience which 
we would now call the political, and looked at it, described its 
boundaries and subjected its content to an analysis whose result was 
disturbing. It indicated that the ideal order could not be reached 
among the phenomena of this world, which were to a large extent, the 
product of illusion and belief. And this meant plans must be dram 
up to enable some men, the right sort of men, to win through to the ideal 
world of Forms. For "In the Republic, myth has been transcended - 
relation between man and cosmos must be restated, on a level consonant 
with his new self-consciousness. At this point political philosophy 
emerges". (22)
So to Gunnell, this is why Plato stands at a critical point on 
Greek philosophy. He reformulates the problems of explaining the world, 
and in the area of man's relation with man, sees the role of political 
man, in the pursuit of the wisdom "which governs the ordering of society" 
(23). In this pursuit the Dionysiac element, the passionate and poetic 
is suppressed.
It is this which causes Wolin (24) to remark that in seeking 
the answer to the problem of order in the Immutable world of the Forms, 
Plato abandons the essential nature of politics. This needs further 
explanation.
Wolin contends that Plato was the first to outline the area 
occupied by the political. Where previous philosophers dealt with the 
undifferentiated phenomena, as they found them in the world, Socrates 
turned away from nature to man and society, but his concern was primarily
ethical. It was Plato who first saw the possibility of society 
becoming a coherent whole, directed by the agency of man. To apply 
his ordering vision, two things are necessary: First, the phenomena
dealt with, must be comprehensible. You cannot order what you do not 
understand unless it be on some completely arbitrary basis. Secondly 
these comprehensible phenomena must be highly plastic, amenable to 
human agency. Having recognised and made explicit for the first time 
in the history of political philosophy, these two fundamental facts,
Plato proceeds to build a political scheme whose main feature is its 
projective quality. It is directed throughout by an imaginitive 
element to a more perfect order in future time.
But despite Plato’s acute political vision, he becomes involved 
in a fundamental paradox: the nature of the political world is one of
change, whereas Plato attempts to create a static order, probably here 
being influenced by the charm of mathematics, and by Pythagorean teaching.
He remained unable to find and establish a satisfactory 
relationship between the idea of the political and the idea of politics. 
By attempting to banish the political context, he did away with politics 
as an art of conciliation. Wolin suggests that political philosophy 
has on the whole tended to follow Plato in this. Those who have not 
and who take into account the leading characteristics of their subject 
matter have generally been judged second rate and seen as apologists 
(e.g. Locke, Machiavelli). They put before us the question "Does 
political association have any necessary connection with eternal truth?"
It is not a question that Plato had to answer, assuming as he 
did, the dominant position of knowledge. But it did pose special 
problems for him. Knowledge of the Good being extra-political, he 
had to find someone to administer power. He chose the philosopher for 
this task, having first selected him from an elite created by training 
specifically designed to produce philosophers. That is, the rulers 
were not trained to deal with the existing world of political change, 
but since they were‘to be agents of an external Good, only the most 
selfless could mediate between divinity and society. This meant, in 
Plato’s "Republic", the philosophers.
Only the philosophers, thought Plato, had the necessary
mental equipment and training to reach the truth, and so only they
could hold the community together. But in a political community it
is consensus,not truth that provides the “bonds. Political order is
not a matter of finding a once and for all solution, as Plato, blinded
v\
by the beauties of ma^ematics, assumed. Bather politics aims at 
stabilities for the moment, given the material, natural and human, and 
the problem at hand. Having discovered in the flux and chaos of 
human relationships in society, the area of the political, Plato 
attempted to find a solution to the problem it presented by eliminating 
its characteristic motion and change. He was left with an architectonic 
theory - but no subject matter.
What Wolin has to say about Plato, has some obvious links with 
Havelock*s thesis, even though Wolin does not go into the ratifications 
of thd fifth century presocratics. In some ways Plato diverts the 
current of philosophical inveistigation by standing, like a boulder, in 
its path. Some streams flow round or even over him and on again, 
scarcely affected. Others are forced into new channels or even completely 
doubled back on themselves. After Plato, philosophy, particularly 
political philosophy, is never the same again.
In an important sense, Plato defines the area of the political. 
Political philosophy as we know it may be said to start with Socrates 
and Plato. But the reason for this is not only that Socrates-Plato 
represents a new kind of thinking and that they introduced new concepts - 
ordered the * given* of the social and political in a new way, but also 
that the Western political tradition has tended to follow Plato*s lead 
and accept his description of the sphere of the political.
This is apparent in a number of ways as we can see by turning 
now to twentieth century political philosophy. I am going to be 
selective here because a large number of writers have attempted to 
outline the * sphere of the political*, or to demonstrate what politics is. 
Michael Oakeshott’s is one of the more well known definition:- ’’attending 
to the arrangements of a group of people whom chance or choice has 
brought together.” (26) As it stands this tells us vaguely what to
expect. Oakeshott expands it by describing the activity of politics 
itself.
It is one of several modes of experience, which together 
participate in a conversation; not a discussion, note, but a conversation, 
where each offers a characteristic contribution, but there is no question 
of any problem being solved, or any decision reached. Of course, the 
fact that politics contributes to this conversation of mankind, does not 
mean that in itself it cannot be concerned with policy making, or 
settlement of disputes, but in describing it as an activity, Oakeshott 
does not seem to have this sort of picture in mind. Rather he sees 
politics as the ’pursuit of intimations' about the course to be steered 
by the 'ship of state*. Pursuing intimation is a skill. It is moreover 
a hard won skill, resulting only from long and arduous practise.
Describing the political in these categories depends on a 
particular epistemology, that which makes a dintinction between theoretical 
and practical knowledge, and finds them both necessary, yet to be 
acquired in different ways. Reading a cookbook won't teach you to cook, 
remarks Oakeshott, only practising cookery can do that. But then we 
want to ask, how do we know when we can cook? By the results we produce? 
We seem to have arrived at pragmatism.
Germino (27) is one of the modem writers on political theory 
who explicitly take up the definition of it provided by Plato describing 
political theory as "an experiential science of right order in human 
society". He urges the rediscovery of a sound ontology and adequate 
epistemology of political theory. Boyce Gibson and Parekh (28) (29) 
urge a similar course of action, and it is not coincidence that they do so.
We find the idea of introducing order into a realm of confusion 
in most if not all the great political texts. Plato's 'Republic* springs 
to mind at once. Order here is extended beyond the human realm into the 
superhuman, the immortal. To take a very different example, Machiavelli 
aimed at civil order. Disorderly states could achieve nothing, and would 
as like as not, plunge into civil war. Hobbes' sovereign was to 
establish order by decree and so rescue his subject from the miserable 
state of anarchy existing in the state of nature.
But Hobbes* vision was largely one of shoring up the river 
banks of a turbulent stream by artifice. The idea of order leaves 
scope for creative syntheses also. This is the force of Germino*s 
description in terms of 'right* order. There is moral force behind 
any attempt at ordering in the political arena, because the outline of 
a particular state of affairs carried with it the recommendation that 
this state of affairs be adopted. The description of a right order for 
society is thus the source of values in the society. In producing the 
description, the political theorist may produce a creative, overarching 
theory, or he may limit himself to allowing only enough room to accommodate 
the most important phenomena in the area. Locke is a good example of a 
theorist who, whilst dealing with the subject matter immediately at hand, 
produced a synthesis containing more than he started with, and clearly 
outlining a particular political order.
Germino shares with Oakeshott the view that experience is the 
basis of political theory, and that this experience is multi-dimensional. 
Following the Platonic-Aristotelean formulation of the problems to be 
dealt with by political means, we are able to characterise the activity 
of the political theorist, which is one of the contributions to the sphere 
of politics, and important to political philosophy,as follows.
Firstly, the political theorist seeks knowledge about political 
reality for its own sake, but this does not mean that such knowledge cannot 
be put to practical use. Indeed, if it has no'-practical implications, 
the theorist has nothing on which to theorise.
Then he bases his understanding on knowledge of human nature.
We are getting closer to the subject matter of the politicalsphere.
Germino states (30) that "the natural political order will be a reflection 
of the order within the psyche of the representative human type". Besides 
being a clear reference to Platonic theory, this is a claim that political 
theory is at once creative and not arbitrary. That is, order is to be 
found in human affairs, where order does not at present prevail, but only 
certain sorts of ordering will achieve their aim.
There is a temptation at this point to draw parallels with 
laws of nature which, in science, are supposed to be waiting to be discovered.
But this is misleading. It may he that psychological factors determine 
the way we *see* things. But since we cannot get * outside* and see 
things in any other way, the acceptance of such a necessity causes us no 
great hardship. Rather the point becomes one of determining the 
representative human type.
It is to this end that political theories are often couched in 
paradigmatic form. Once again a standard has been incorporated in our 
idea of the political. Germino may want to maintain only that there are 
certain limitations to the kind of theory we produce if we want it to be 
an adequate one politically. If, that is, if it is to have even 
hypothetical practicality. But by describing what human beings are, 
he is including creatures which do not meet this requirement, and thus 
indulging - necessarily - in normative activity.
Thirdly and lastly for Germino, we come to the crux of the 
task of the political theorist, as can be extracted from the works of 
Aristotle and Plato. I will quote it in full because it is a view that 
has influenced many political philosophers, and is implicit in most of 
the traditional works of political philosophy. "In accordance with his 
experimental understanding of human nature, he will construct a model 
of the paradigmatic society, or best regime, and will explore the 
relationship between this ’natural* order and the types of regimes which 
appear in history, establishing to what degree they deviate from and ignore 
the principles of natural order, and describing, or at least intimating, 
the consequences which ensue to the unnatural regimes with regard to 
their own internal order." (32)
Order is placed firmly in the forefront of political concern.
It is the task of the political theorist to seek out natural order and 
to incorporate this in a paradigmatic description of a political society.
I suspect that Germino here begs a question by introducing the 
idea of a discoverable natural order. The force of *natural* in this 
context is meant to imply that unless the kind of order the theorist builds 
his system on, fits his subject matter, there will be a serious flaw in his 
theorising. But talking about natural order implies that there is only
one such order, and further, that it is evident in the world, waiting 
only to he recognised.
However one of the striking features of political subject 
matter is its diversity. We call certain actions of Omen ’political’
and certain motivations. These two things, actions and motivations
are usually very complex, and so are the relations between them in an 
individual human being. To put a large number of human beings together 
in a society, and then search for a natural order to encompass them, 
seems an impossible task.
It has, however, been attempted many times. There are certain 
philosophical tools available to assist the seeker after natural order; 
these are generalisation, model building, thinking in analogies and so 
on. But it is I think, misleading to construe ’natural1 here as similar 
to ’natural* in the physical sciences. * Natural* in that realm tends to 
have the status of an established fact about the physical world: Something
that could not be otherwise, and that is established by correct theory.
In politics it is not possible to arrive at this sort of 
certainty. (Even in the physical sciences such a view would be taken 
as a gross oversimplification of the actual relationship between theory 
and ’matter of fact*). The subject matter of politics precludes it.
Is it possible to give an outline of this subject matter? It 
is easier to point to the things that are considered to comprise political 
activity. But before we take even this step there are assumptions to be 
made plain.
B. C. Parekh in his article on"The Nature of Political 
Philosophy' (33) spells out some of these assumptions. To recapitulate, 
he maintains that before any political philosophy can be undertaken, 
political activity must be shown to be autonomous and distinctive, i.e. not 
to be confounded with other kinds of activity.
The claim to autonomy has various features. When you ask 
significant questions about the activity, for instance, the answers must 
be able to be about the activity in question, and not te5 resolve themselves
into answers couched in terms of another activity, sociology or economics 
spring to mind here. Other indications of autonomy are more closely 
linked with the possibility of having a philosophy of the activity.
No philosophy would be possible, however, if these features were not 
present. That is to say the autonomy of an activity shows itself in 
certain ways when we begin to think about it in philosophic terms, but 
unless it is an autonomous and distinctive activity, such philosophic 
investigation will be impossible.
Thus for politics to be such an activity, it must be capable 
of being fruitfully studied in terms appropriate to itself. These terms 
must be logically related to one another in a way in which they are not 
related to others, and together they must constitute a complex that has 
a certain degree of internal unity and homogeneity. These requirements 
of Parekh1s make clear in very broad terms, the characteristic of an 
activity that open it to philosophical inquiry.
Does politics show these characteristics? Whilst not denying 
that talk about political activity can be carried on at many levels, and for 
many different purposes, Parekh considers that it does. There are activities 
that we can describe only as politicals such things as making policy 
decisions, deciding what constitution to adopt, or even starting a 
revolution. And although starting from such subject matter, we 
can produce pamphlets, literature, ideology or morality, such literature 
etc. will be distinctively political, and will not fit into any other 
category without spilling over, so to speak.
Parekh makes an appeal to experience in a certain way. It 
emerges as activity, autonomous and distinctive activity and as such is 
amenable to philosophical treatment. Can we say anything further about 
the sort of activity, or the experience we call political?
In an important way, politics is a public activity. We do not 
call the internal debate with our conscience over whether to go and visit 
our aged grandmother political activity. But if Grandmother lives on the 
other side of a frontier, then the action of paying her a visit may have 
political repercussions. These will not, however, affect merely me and 
my conscience. If they did they would be moral, or spiritual -or-oemo thing.
No, the action becomes political when it affects the public 
sectbr: when as a result of my carelessness in crossing frontiers, all 
the citizens of the state to which I belong have their passports revoked, 
or their right of entry removed. And a right of entry itself is not a 
private thing. It does not belong to me as an individual of this or 
that disposition or character, but to me as a citizen of a certain state, 
with relations with other states.
Bernard Crick carries the implications of this point further 
in a discussion of ’’freedom as politics”. Politics as an institution 
is the conflict of differing interests (whether ideal or material) in an 
acknowledged mutual context. Politics as an activity is the conciliation 
of these differing interests in the public context created by a state or 
maintained by a government. Politics as a moral activity is the creative 
conciliation of these interests. (34)
Crick carries the description of politics a stage further with 
the inclusion of the phrase ’’created by a state or maintained by a 
government” for this is the feature of public activity that makes it 
political. It is for this reason that Oakeshott’s definition of "attending 
to the arrangements^etc. is too vague to be useful. It provides general 
background, a sort of primary orientation against which to sketch out our 
subject matter, but there are many sorts of arrangements and an equal 
number of activities to take care of them. Public arrangements they must 
be to be political and linked more or less directly with governmeht or the 
state.
But governments and states are not natural phenomena. They 
are not just there, but are essentially created. This is not to; say that 
they are entirely arbitrary, because if they were not suitable or expedient, 
or in some other fairly direct way related to the individual members that 
constituted them, or who looked to them to administer justice, provide 
money etc. they would not last long. But created means more than that.
They are not in the world in the same way that the stars are, or the 
mountains, or the way human beings have two legs.
In Volin’s words: "the field of politics has been, in a 
significant and radical sense, a created one. The designation of certain 
activities and arrangements as political, the characteristic way that
we think about them, and the concepts we employ to communicate our 
observations and reactions - hone of these are written into the nature 
of things but are the legacy accruing from the historical activity of 
political philosophers.’1 (35)
This passage makes points at two levels. It first of all 
points to the traditional nature of political thought, a point that 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter YL• Hence the importance
of historical appreciation of political thought. But whoever we decide 
first formulated the framework in which political theorists have worked, 
or against which they have reacted, did so in demand to certain exigencies 
of his achievement. He saw that in the activities of men there were 
certain eternal problems, to which an answer must be found, The only 
possible answer was one which he could produce. It might be based 
on his reflections of the state of affairs in the natural world - witness 
the effect of Aristotle’s biological interests in his politics - but in 
the end it must be appropriate to a particular area of purely human 
phenomena.
It is the peculiarity of the thinker in a situation such as 
this, to be one of the phenomena with which he is wrestling so that whilst
having a special sort of insight into them, he may also, in his reactions
to outside events, determine the events that will in the future take place. 
This is also what Wolin means by politics being a created sphere.
Moreover remembering the suggestion we adopted earlier that 
political theorists aim to find the right order for society, we gain an 
insight into the nature of this order by reflecting that it is not an order 
to be picked out by mixing up ingredients and seeing what result comes 
about. Unlike a kaleidoscope we know it will not fall into a pattern 
when we stop agitating it. It will go on in a ferment and we will be 
forced constantly to rearrange our particular plans to deal with 
contingencies of the moment.
These rearrangements may include varying areas in the sphere 
of human activity, so again the area we designate by political is created.
It is as if we have a moveable and flexible fence. We put it down,
enclose certain phenomena, which are then seen as a ’field’, but we may 
at any time be forced, to pick it up again, lengthen or shorten or
distort it in response to pressures from the field in which we are 
engrossed.
One of the outstanding features of the Aristotlean/Platonicr- 
notion of political theory, is the search for the Good. It is not enough
to establish order, it must be right order or the only Good order to
engble its citizens to lead the good life. Such an aim includes action
in the political sphere and understanding and this dual aim is
typical of politics as a whole.
Particular political decisions may only achieve compromise.
They do answer the need for action at that moment in time, under those 
circumstances. But a political decision has a much more general 
connotation, in that it or its consequences are aimed towards greater 
understanding of the political features under scrutiny. By making a 
particular political decision, we hope to gain an insight into the 
situation or predicament in which we are plunged, and so to see more 
dearly where the next action lies.
By acknowledging this wider aim of political theory; we can 
see how there comes to be such a topic as political philosophy.
Parekh describes philosophy as "A radically and self­
consciously critical interpretation of the nature of any phenomenon 
one happens to be inquiring into”. (36) Adopting such a definition 
firmly grounds philosophy in experience and at the same time explains 
the possibility of political philosophy. As long as the sphere of 
the political can be identified and is autonomous, and I think the 
preceding argument has shown that it is, it can be investigated in a 
philosophical manner. Such an investigation will lead to results,in 
the form, Parekh thinks, of interpretations.
This is not a statement of the relativity of all critical 
appreciations of subject matter, but an attempt to make explicit the 
ground from which philosophic inquiry must start. It is important to 
be aware of the ground because otherwise a philosophic project may be 
foredoomed. If we think we are doing something which is impossible, 
intrinsically impossible and ruled out by the nature of the project in 
hand, we are unlikely to succeed in our enterprise. The point is really 
one that is familiar in history, i.e. that contemporary historians are
themselves part of the history they relate, and that we, reading their 
writings, must do so from our own century, from our own stance in the 
historical procession. There is no such thing as a ’pure historical 
fact’•
Similarly, there is no such thing as a ’pure philosophical 
fact or value’. Pact and value are all wrapped up together and trapped 
in the interpretation of the subject matter we move to.
Michael Oakeshott wants to make explanation the most important 
feature of political philosophy. An explanation is some way of 
ordering our experience. But Parekh argues that explanation cannot 
be taken an logically ultimate; there is a. further step we can take, 
and see that interpretation is the ultimate counter in the game. It 
is interpretation that yields understanding, and this in its turn is 
what political philosophy is aiming at.
That is, political philosophy is not essentially a descriptive 
exercise. In it you start off with chaos, or at least multiplicity,
(this is one of the recurring factors in characterisation of the political 
sphere) and attempt to reduce the chaos to order. You do not just say
here i s  and count off the elements of the multiplicity, but produce
some theory relating them to one another, and in turn to phenomena of 
different sorts: understanding can demand no less, and the justification
of philosophy is arrival at an understanding, however incomplete.
So fact and theory are interdependent. The kind of theory 
produced depends on the sort of facts the theorist finds when he looks, 
but the theory scoops up only the sort of things it can hold as facts.
The two are part of a single process out of which can emerge understanding, 
which is at the same time the aim and the result of the original inquiry.
To sum up then, it is useful to regard political philosophy 
as concerned with the problem of order, arising from our multi- 
demensional experience. Plato realised the problem in this form, though 
other, earlier elements of Greek thought contribute to the way we see 
the political sphere today.
This sphere is autonomous and grournyrn our experience. By
53.
investigating it philosophically we aim to interpret it and so increase 
our understanding of the world. It is besides, a public activity 
aiming at knowledge of the good, and to some degree a created field.
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CHAPTER III
H U M A N  A C T I O N
(*Once the political sphere has been picked out it becomes apparent that 
there are various spots of explanation that are the concern of political 
philosophy. Among this are explanation of human action.)
Explanation takes various forms in political philosophy, some of 
which will be indicated in the next section, but throughout it is concerned 
with the political activities of human beings. Description of a ’sphere 
of the political’ helps us to pick out these actions, and the events, 
institutions and other ’things’ they involve, from human actions in general. 
But as a species of explanation of human action, explanation in political 
philosophy shares some of its characteristics.
A great deal has been written about ’action* and whether it 
can be distinguished from mere behaviour. Or more accurately, because 
as a matter of brute fact, we do treat some behaviour as purposeful, 
directed and some not, about the theoretical distinguishing characteristic 
of each. I think it is true to say that the problem, although not 
inconveniencing us in our everyday lives, remains philosophically puzzling 
and that no one has yet established, beyond a doubt, where „its solution 
would lie if it could be found. The question remains open.
But, to take an impersonal standpoint, people do exhibit 
political behaviour, or to be more daring, they perform political actions, 
which afford the subject matter of political philosophy.
Clearly, there is a difference between the activity of politics 
and political philosophy. Politics involves settling disputes, setting 
up committees of investigation, speaking out on public matters, arguing 
for or against a certain course of action, and so on. Political philosophy 
on the other hand, is an intellectual activity: it isn’t intrinsically
involved in going anywhere or even talking to anyone. But this is not 
to say, as some recent philosophers have done, (notably Weldon) that 
political philosophy is entirely a second order activity, that all political 
philosophy can do is sort out linguistic tangles involving political terms.
Or, in Weldon's own words
Mthe purpose of philosophy • •.. • is to expose and elucidate 
linguistic muddles, it has done its job when it has revealed the confusions 
which have occurred and are likely to recur in inquiries into matter of 
fact, because the structure and use of language are what they are." (37)
Saying that philosophy is a second order activity involves 
thorough grounding in matters of the first order, but is supposed to make 
it clear that political philosophy is of no direct relevance to the 
decisions of politicians. It may be that the results of philosophy can 
have a psychological effect on the beliefs a politician comes to hold, but 
these results do not constitute a set of persuasive arguments in favour 
of one course of action. They only expose the degree of internal 
consistency of any such cause.
Such a standpoint assumed a number of things about language, 
one of which is the possibility of treating linguistic muddles and muddles 
about matter of fact, separately. True, one can make an arbitrary decision 
to do so, but it does not follow from this adademic move that a particular 
muddle will thereby be solved. The existence of a mode of speech or a 
word often reveals a certain line of thought, and if there is no alternative 
mode of speech, not only is our vocabulary limited, but so also is our 
thinking curtailed. Since new words and concepts do appear in a given 
language from time to time, this restriction on thought is not necessarily 
permanent, (or even primary) but it is a consequence of close connection 
between thought and language; a connection does enough to undermine the 
sort of close restriction on the scope of philosophy Weldon wants to 
uphold, probably for historical reasons.
A strongly contrasting view of political philosophy is held 
by J. G. A. Pocock who, concerned with the relation of theory to action, 
maintains that philosophy is found when Ma thinker mobilises the principal 
moral and metaphysical ideas known to him with the intention of bringing 
political experience under their control and explaining it by their means."(38) 
Can two such disparate views of the nature of political philosophy be 
reconciled or even explained? It seems an important question particularly 
for this inquiry.
S. H. Rosen, in a paper in 'Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research'(39) argues that conflicting opinions on the nature of political 
philosophy, like those of Weldon and Pocock, can he maintained only by 
ignoring the essential circularity of the search for meaning. It is 
neglect of this circularity that has blinded philosophers to the solution 
of the epistemological quarrel between logical empiricism and classical 
rationalism (Weldon and Pocock respectively), which exists only as long 
as the two sides do not realise they are involved in a paradox, which 
logical empiricism refuses to recognise.
For when we try to solve a problem, perhaps by setting out 
the primitive rules of inference of the new system we are going to build 
up, we start off in the ordinary idiom. We formulate the problem in 
common sense language, because if we did not, it would be incomprehensible. 
We start to formulate extraordinary languages in this idiom. But then 
we must face the question of the meaning of ordinary language. It must 
have a meaning, or we could not express our problem in its terms. Where 
do we discover this meaning?
The answer is that we do not discover it anywhere. We decide 
on it. Except in the widest terms we do not cull it from experience, 
because to do so we must make a previous decision as to what to include 
in experience. Nor can we appeal to reality, for here the same argument 
applies. We just prefer our epistemology, our system of meaning, because 
we prefer it. This assumption of a starting point, Rosen calls 'magic' 
and he finds it very important when he goes on to the task of political 
philosophy. Epistemology and political philosophy are inextricably 
connected since "our explanation of how we know is reciprocally connected 
with our explanation of what we know" (40) This is a more general 
statement of the connection between thought and language touched on above.
Its implications are worked out in terms of Popper's 
distinction between 'open* and 'closed' societies. Popper characterises 
'open* societies by their concern with empiricism. Empiricists maintain 
that 'closed' societies, have opposite tendencies, should be characterised 
by fascism, and antipathetic attitudes towards science and mathematics.
But this does not follow, either from Popper’s definition or from a 
glance at America and Russia, supposedly paradigm cases to the two kinds 
of society.
Rather, says Rosen, "One way of putting the political teaching 
of Socrates is to say that ail societies are "closed"; the serious question 
is which form of magic we are going to accept." (41) The empiricists, 
who pride themselves on their openness to all stimuli, have in fact 
adopted a particular doctrine of human nature, in which the emphasis on 
perception means primarily sense perception, and abandoned all other 
starting points for philosophical systems. Their notion of the "common- 
sense" world, available to us all, is a good example of what Rosen calls 
magic. Another important example is the criterion of meaning or 
significance. To make the notion of magic clearer, I will quote at 
length from the article.
".. the "commonsense" world is a magical notion which no
Cone has ever suceeded in satisfactorily locating or describing. It is 
not the world of logic and mathematics for it is concrete and riddled 
with inconsistency; logic and mathematics are not observed but make 
our observations coherent. As Hume pointed out, no one has ever observed 
a necessary connection. Nor is the "commonsense" world an abstraction 
from the sum of particular experiences, because (i) it makes these 
experienced possible, and (ii) particular experiences (thought and sensed) 
seem to cancel each other out by contradiction rather than to combine in
an intelligible pattern it i s  a magical world in that we do
not really understand it, yet see it at all times and everywhere. And 
without it we would be totally lost: it serves as a container or matrix
for all our experiences, thought or sensed. In a phrase of Heidegger's, 
we are 'in-der-welt-sein'". (42)
Thus all societies are 'closed* but some are aware of the magic 
they employ and some are not. Other magical constructions are 'state' 
'nation', 'city', together with their entailed values. The importance 
of such magical notions is the part they play in establishing the way in 
which we live, the political order we adopt. To achieve harmony Rosen 
sees three alternatives (1) thought control, (2) freedom and (3) judicious 
use of magic,. So adopting the last involves us in a search for a society 
which is aware.
It also outlines an important role for political philosophy. 
Through his analysis which seems to me substantially correct and moreover 
fecund, Rosen has hooked political philosophy onto the world of real things. 
"Political things (acts and concepts) are not only real" he says, "they 
constitute the most secure zone of our experience, being even more secure 
than sense perception, or at least as real. They are sufficiently real 
to make us happy or sad, to get us killed or permit us to live." (43)
This in itself is of paramount importance, but he has further 
underlined the importance of explanation in political philosophy, and 
defines its epistemological role "Our explanation of how we know is 
reciprocally connected to our explanation of what we know." Adopting 
Rosen's description of political philosophy enables us to see the 
explanatory role of values.
The sort of blurring of distinctions, have been discovered
A*
between thought and language, and language and meaning suggests that we 
should take another look at that between fact and value, especially since 
in politics the two are closely connected. One important question 
in political activity is the kind of life a particular course of action 
will lead to.
Traditionally philosophers have searched for the good life, in 
political philosophy particularly it has been their concern to outline 
an order for society that would enable the values for which they argued, 
to find expression. That they described this order according to their 
view of human nature can be seen by contrasting Locke's idea, of the role 
of government with the sovereign of Hobbes' 'Leviathan' for instance. But 
values concern us here in a rather more general way.
Through the use of values we are able to describe behaviour in 
terms of action. So bearing this in mind we can understand political 
activity a little better. Since, as Rescher points out "Values do not 
enter descriptions of human affairs as disruptive influences; rather, they 
allow us to describe human behaviour in terms of action" (44). We must see 
if values have a role to play in explanation.
m  W\a
Rescher contends that £©• explain^the behaviour of a person, 
we presume that he endorses a certain "way of life" and that he "believes 
his hehaviour will forward his achieving it. This seems a little tortuous 
and the notion of belief.is a problematical one where actions are concerned 
at least from the observer’s point of view. However, there is no doubt 
that political action is intimately connected with a vision of a "way of 
life", and many intractable political arguments are based on ’a pipri’ 
adoptions of different visions.
In the explanation of political actions, values are imparted 
to characterise the good life, and used to describe and account for 
behaviour, individual and collective. Human action is one of the things 
that political philosophy tries to explain.
How politics and political philosophy could both be called 
activities, and anyone indulging in them could be said to perform actions, 
strictly, once we had settled on our definition of that term, but trivially 
as well. To gain further insight into the connection between politics 
and political philosophy, take Sussanne Hanger’s analysis of the act 
concept. (45)
fa
Miss Hanger describes,concept as ’fecund and elastic’. It has 
three phases; and takes place where there is already some fairly constant 
movement going on. Movement here refers to conceptual break and change, 
or activity a,s a whole, not the merely mechanical.
The first phase is a build up in tension. Secondly the tension 
is released, in one of; «?• a variety of possible ways. Finally the 
tension is resolved. The three phases provide the general description 
of an event we call an act. But they are more than a way of describing 
it, for they constitute its formal requirements. It follows that any 
one of them may encompass other acts, or itself be so encompassed.
Thus an act is organic in character. It is an event that 
takes place where movement is already going on, and it results in a change 
of pattern. The change in pattern marks the end of the second phase, 
and heralds the third phase, which is usually the most valuable in form.
Miss Langer has worked the theory out with respect to 
works of art. The organic character of any good work of art is seen 
in terms of its semblance of living form. There are echoes of this in 
the preoccupation of philosophers - and scientists - with what is 
’natural*, but the affect of this analysis carried into the political 
sphere is more general than this.
Some such pattern of build up, release, and resolution of 
tension is peculiarly appropriate to interpretation of political thought 
through the ages. This is not merely because such interpretation is 
historically based. It has to do with the concern of politics with 
resolution of tension in society, or at least an attempt to minimise it 
by balancing out opposing forces.
Political tension can be located in popular unrest, expression 
of dissatisfaction with contemporary government, demand for electoral 
reform, and so on. Once this unrest has come to a head, we could study 
its discharge, which might or might not be successful. Revolts which 
were curbed might subside, or force concessions from overlords. Successful 
revolution could change social conditions, or bring in electoral reform.
The second stage would be concerned with the mechanisms of articulating 
the revolt, or other form in which the tension was manifested.
The third stage, in the political sphere would be the political 
solution which was arrived at, the ’changed pattern'.
Now political writers* it seems, can assist at any one of these 
three junctures. They can contribute to the build up of tension, by 
pointing out difficulties or anomalies in a system, and these need not be 
real ones. They can argue about the ways the change should be metered 
out, although qua writers they have no ’prima facie* say in the actual 
process of which this is done, and finally, they can describe, or even 
determine the form the resolution of tension shall take.
They do this by providing motives and reasons. Insofar as 
these motives and reasons are historically based political philosophers 
are necessarily justifiers, they write after the event, as Oakeshott 
pointed out. But insofar as they detect a radically new pattern in
political affairs, a pattern which may make it impossible to return 
to the old state of affairs, and they explain this and make their audience 
aware of it, they are innovators.
The beauty of this model of action is that it fits in with 
the contingent nature of political facts. The equilibrium reached at 
any one time in politics may itself become the old pattern from which 
a new one can emerge, when the tensions inherent in it have built up 
to a sufficiently high pitch. These tensions may be augmented by 
parallel events in dther spheres. Hence the elasticity of the notion 
of act.
To expand this points Revolution in fashion, in art or in a 
completely private sphere, may all contribute to 3. change in the political 
or public sphere by changing behavioural patterns. These changes 
contribute to tensions in the political sphere. The notion of a tension 
here is something which disrupts a pattern of living, which perhaps 
introduces new factors into public decision making. It may even alter 
the area in which we consider the decision making to apply.
Consider the changes in attitude involved and caused by 
nineteenth century poor law legislation, factory or education acts.
Hence Suzanne Hanger’s analysis of the form of an act explains why we 
see both Wolin and Hannah Arendt employing the notion of ’political space’. 
Different patterns contain or define different spaces. Tensions crea/te 
these patterns.
Within the sphere of politics too, the notion of a tension is 
a fruitful one. There may be tension between the values a society 
endorses, made manifest in its legal system, or the publicly expressed 
views of its politicians, and the means it provides for realising them.
The political philosopher in his writing may point these out, and pressure 
of public opinion may result in the act which changes them, changes the 
pattern, and results in a fruitful conclusion.
Politicians on the other hand can be regarded as active in the 
second phase: meting out'';the charge resulting from the build-up in tension.
It is their job to detect the extent and direction of the tensions 
and either counter them with some opposing force, or provide the means 
to resolve them. In either case they must act, and as Aristotle rightly 
saw, must provide means, as the first step towards the realisation of aims.
st)]?1political philosophers task differs from the politicians.
If the politician is primarily concerned with the second phase of action 
the political philosopher is concerned with all three. The tensions he 
is likely to produce are in the world of ideas, in making people more or 
less aware of their political situation, and of the results of political 
action on a large-scale.
Another analysis of the field.politics arising from a discussionA
of action, is performed by Hannah Arendt. Her view may be contrasted with 
that of Wolin. She characterises politics as action in the public sphere, 
and sees the development of political theory since Plato as series of 
attempts to curtail this sphere of action.
"Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and 
order has in fact so much to recommend it that the greater part of 
political philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as 
various attempts to find theoretical foundations and practical ways for 
an escape from politics altogether.” (46)
Plato started the process by setting up a ruler and subjects.
This in effect substituted making for acting. His Republic outlined 
a society which could be made, fabricated, not one which allowed for action 
within itself, for constant resurgance, for the possibility of a man 
achieving his own set of aims. Instead it is the ruler who must be 
followed.
Aristotle, as Wolin points out, located the true end of political 
society in action, but saw also that action is fraught with change, 
contingent events, and general uncertainty. Although he did not make 
Plato’s mistake of confusing unison in society with social harmony, the 
picture of the good society he presented was also a static one. Each 
was to pursuehis individual end.
However, if each produced his own end, unless he is a genius 
he can never transcend himself. He thus becomes his own jailer. This
needs expanding in Arendt’s terms to become intelligible. Only the 
work of genius transcends its human agent. Other men when they make 
things, do not surpass themselves. Thus they cannot be said, in the 
true sense of the word, to act. They merely substitute fabrication for 
action and never reach out beyond themselves.
If the ruler hands do\m laws, and is sovereign in his country, 
the labourer is condemned to remain within himself in the political sphere 
also. He has lost another opportunity to realise his human uniqueness, 
his plurality. Since politics is concerned with this plurality, with 
maintaining a fruitful tension, politics also has been destroyed. Wolin 
makes a similar point with special reference to Pla,to. Plato’s deep 
mistrust of opinion led him to exblude provisions for its expression in 
political society. This leads to a paradox. The society thus created 
can no longer be considered political because there is not. exchange of 
expressions of opinion going on within it, so the subject matter of politics 
has been removed completely.
Arendt is entitled to see thid ad a catastrophe because of her 
general stand on speech and action as the true sources of humanness in 
human beings.
"In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, 
while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own 
in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice." (47)
Expression in the form of action and speech, reveal the unique 
"whoness" of someone, or to put it more elegantly, point to agency.
Politics is this agency in action.
Wolin takes a more limited view, though this does not preclude 
his adoption of some such epistemological standpoint as the one we have just 
seen. He states simply that by drawing a static utopia, Plato has caused 
the realm of the political to stagnate. Such was the force of this Utopia, 
that it has silted up the main spring of political thought ever since.
The uncertainty in politics is not something to be got rid of. It springs 
from the nature of the subject matter.
This nature, spelled out in the ’Human Conditioh’ is 
that of the web of relationships•between men. Because men can act, 
and revoke the consequences of actions and promises, by forgiveness, 
they can break out of the mechanistic world, where there is no agency, 
therefore no action. No action means just process without the possibility 
of agency or of politics. There exists a web of relationships, an 
interpersonal sphere, which must of necessity, differ from the causal 
and other relationships existing between things. Wolin makes the point 
that a political society is simultaneously trying to act, and to remain 
a community. This can be compared with Miss Arendt’s point that there 
has been an erroneous identification of sovereignty with freedom. Anything 
which postulates freedom, and at the same time denies plurality, the essential 
plurality arising from human freedom to act, is mistaken.
Sovereignty is just such a denial of plurality. Cashed out
in political terms this again lays stress on participation in public matters 
by the public (Crick’s point: freedom is public decision making). It is
no good building a Utopia ruled over by philosopher-kings, if they in their 
so-called wisdom, rule, by law or any other means. Such rule imposed from 
never so rarefied a realm, means that the ruled are cut off from the web 
of interpersonal relationships, where the subject matter of politics is 
to be found.
So the political society functioning as a community, cannot do
so -unless the individuals within it are free to act. It seems there can
be no guarantee that having gained this freedom, or since they have it 
qua men, and keep it as long as they do not become downgraded to mere 
fabricators, having gained this freedom they will not act in such a way 
that their sodiety of the moment will disintegrate. This can be attacked 
another way from Wolin’s remark that "a political judgment is "true" when 
it is public, not public when it accords to some standard external to 
politics.*1
However,- attaining some sort of order though not necessarily 
uniformity, pace Miss Arendt, has its advantages. It ^diminishes the 
need to expend energy in the area. It allows exploration of areas of 
’give’ where people’s views can be influenced, and it is a necessary 
precondition of the political skill of knowing when not to act.
Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, saw that unity would be 
death to the political community. Instead he proposed that the aim 
should be uniformity, but a uniformity in fruitful tension. That is 
everyone should be pursuing t!r!casr. own ends, and this should be the basis 
for social harmony. It is- not a static notion, but it is influenced 
by the historical factors of the nature of the ’polis’ its size and 
method of organisation, and Aristotle’s preoccupation with Marine biology.
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CHAPTER IY 
S Y M B O L I S M .
Examples of explanation used in political philosophy
So far all that has heen said about explanation in political 
philosophy has been general# How I am going to explore three particular 
kinds of explanation that assume importance in political philosophy: the
symbolic, the paradigmatic and the traditional. Throughout the history of 
political philosophy these kinds of explanation occur again and again, the 
reason is not fortuitous. They are all concernBd with order. And order, 
as we saw in Section II, is one of the prime concerns of politics.
Symbolism is more often thought of as a literary or artistic 
device, than a philosophical one. Perhaps this is because of its 
association with the fanciful side of man’s nature when politics is a topic 
calculated to make grey-beards shake their heads. Still if we look at 
symbolism as it emerges from myth we shall see that it has played an 
important part in political thinking. The way a topic is presented, the 
categories and kinds of image used to actuate it, all have a strong effect 
on its constitution.
It is difficult to find examples of mythic thought, because to 
present them at all, we are forced to take up a certain angle of view.
This may give a perspective over the complete subject matter, but it is 
only one perspective of the many that mythic thought, or a mythic explanation 
necessarily includes. So we could disentangle the philosophical elements 
of the creation myth, for example. Or we could follow Fraser, who in 
’The Golden Bough’ interprets myths in an anthropological way, in terms 
of social institutions of the prehistoric past (as Comford succinctly 
observes (48)). But in neither case would we have received, all in one 
go, the full impact of the mythic explanation we started from. We are so 
far limited by our intellectual tradition.
This is not to say that no one today can produce a myth. But 
we cannot understand by an ancient myth the same thing as its ancient
originator and his hearers. Our background is different, so that, if 
you like, the same myth sounds different harmonics in our ears, from those 
it sounded 2,000 or more years ago. However, we can still attempt 
mythopoeic thinking. We can attempt to face the world with the whole 
of our being, and not just with our rational faculties. Perhaps if we 
did so, more and richer political philosophy would be the result.
But this is speculation, and the main topic of the section is 
examples. If, as I have suggested, there are difficulties attached to a 
purely mythic explanation, for the twentieth century philosopher, is there 
a remedy? I think so. Let us look at the development of presocratic 
thought up to the watershed of Socrates/Plato; the watershed where we 
have already located the birthplace of the political sphere as we know it 
(section II).
Presocratic thought is much closer to mythic thought than our 
own, yet it contains ideas on which much of our present thought is based. 
It seems, therefore, eminently suitable for our purpose.
Tradition located the twin birthplaced of modem science in 
Miletus, and in Southern Italy, But the presocratic thinkers who lived 
there did not speculate on their physical environment alone, and they did 
not separate the phenomena of the world into categories, as we do. 
Collingwood for instance (49) has produced a persuasive analysis of the 
changing content of the world picture through history. The Greeks 
attributed to the physical world, properties we would limit to the realm 
of the mind. But we can recognise the areas that engaged their interest. 
They set up the game. We still use the some counters, even if we are 
more fussy about keeping the different colours separate.
In studying philosophy, philosophy of science in particular 
you are aware that most of the ideas you meet ’have their roots in* or 
’go back to* some ancient Greek or other, so that it is a shock to realise 
how little of their work survives in its original form. It is also sad, 
because there is always the possibility that an important and exciting 
idea rotted away with an ancient parchment, or was burnt by a barbarian 
horde. But ideas live not only, or not principally in books, but in the 
imagina-tion of the people who encounter them. The very insouciance that
prevented such philosophers as Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and Parmenides 
from ensuring the safety of their written work, argues for an awareness 
that ideas are common property; arising from experience essentially 
personal, but becoming public in communication.
So let us investigate the presocratic philosophers. What they 
said is important, but how they said it is much more so. The expression 
of their ideas still fires our imagination and the imagination of 
philosophers, historians and poets.
Nietzsche may be said to belong to all three of these categories, 
and he is one of the peopl.e whose views on the presocratics in relation 
to Plato throws most light on political philosophy, in his book 
"Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" he uses ideas in general 
rather than ideas in any specific category.
For instance one of his themes is the opposition of the 
Dionysiac to the Apollonian elements of thought. The former is dark 
and chaotic, characterised by frenzy and orgy while the latter stands 
forcHder, measure, form and civilisation. The Dionysiac element 
stands for the need to shed personality and individuality and plunge 
into the world in all its chaos, whilst this is opposed in the Apollonic 
genius; plastic and architectonic.
They are united in the spirit of traCjegjy exemplified by the 
works of Aeschylus and Sophocles.
In explaining in terms of two archetypes, Nietzsche is using 
a literary technique, but one that is very relevant in political 
philosophy. It underlines the shifting nature of the subject matter 
of politics, and presents schematically the possibility of reaching some, 
however, impermanent, synthesis.
The two elements here employed delineate aspects of man which 
any political theory must take into account, and the tension between 
the two is that which first caused man to see politics as a subject at all. 
The removal of this tension by building an ideal system or by sublimation 
has been the concern of all political philosophers.
If all men wanted the same thing, had the same ambitions, 
reacted in the same way to the vagaries of life, politics would be 
reduced to a search for the best way to gratify these wishes* A 
large area of what we now consider its subject matter i.e. the definition 
of aims, would become redundant, and political science truly would have 
taken over from political philosophy. Indeed the whole area might be 
covered by political technologists and engineers churning out more and 
more of the stuff to satisfy infinitely predictable man.
It could be objected to this that even if all wants and 
ambitions were known thereby reducing the problem of ordering society to 
one of techniques of manufacture and distribution, the politician would 
still have a place as a manipulator, whose job was to secure the best 
possible distribution patterns, and that because he was still concerned 
with the ’best* his job would in some way involve searching for norms. 
Norms in turn imply standards and so political philosophy is reinstated, 
albeit in abbreviated form.
This is pure hypothesis. Historically we can see that one of 
the main problems political philosophers have had to grapple with has been 
the definition of ends and the distribution of the means of gratifying 
them, which usually involves adjustment of the tensions within a society. 
Nietzsche1s literary vision makes it plainer what some of these tensions 
are. To remove the tensions altogether, as Wolin recognises, (50) 
results in annhilation of the political sphere. When the relationships 
man has, exert no pressures on him and set up no tensions one with the 
other, politics as the art of keeping these pressures in productive 
equilibrium, has no subject matter.
In fact a solution which achieves this would be alien to man’s 
nature, for as Sartre says, he is the only creature who is stretched 
towards the future whilst forced to live in the present, and his attempts 
to deal with this predicament are the raw material of the sphere of the 
political.
Nietzsche traces development of ideas through Thales to 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, to Anaxagoras via Xenophanes and 
Zeno. His choice of philosophers is revealing of his own bias.
(Compare it for instance with that of Russell (51)) at the same time 
a masterly development of the history of ideas.
For Thales, water constituted the basic stuff of the universe and 
gave it its unity. This was a simplification of the many to the one. 
Anaximander took this up, but in order to account for the self- 
contradictions in the character of the many, posited ’apeiron’ - the 
indefinite - in place of water.
The influence of these two on political philosophy lies in their 
implicit recognition ofaa problem that is later to be made explicit, 
and which they attempt in a rudimentary way, to solve, by the postulation 
of first substance. It is characteristic of the presocratics that they 
should turn to metaphysics to answer the problems of physics and 
philosophy indiscriminately. They both formulated principles, thereby 
using inductive rather than deductive reasoning. The kind of principles 
they considered adequate for explanation had very different contents 
from what we should expect in philosophy today. They were much broader 
and not abstract. That is they did not try to isolate in their 
formulation facts about the world, from abstract thought, although they 
are couched in terms which go to the root of an abstract problem, that 
of the order of the universe and man’s place within this order.
Thales simplified the many to the one whilst Anaximander widened 
this to accept the self contradictory character of the many. In some 
sense Thales may be seen as the forerunner of Utopia-builders whilst 
Anaximander had a stronger grasp of the fundamental diversity of all 
things.
However these tendencies were, as far as we know, not explicitly 
stated in the works of these two writers. It is in the works of 
Heraclitus and Parmenides that the two different approaches crystallise.
Heraclitus’ famous- dictum about not being able to step into the 
same river twice shows his emphasis on becoming. Nothing is. Everything 
is coming to be or ceasing to be and we are caught in a constant state of 
flux. A theory of politics developed from this starting point could only 
attempt to maintain equilibrium. It might even tend to conservatism 
and the theory that it is useless to attempt to implement a grand system.
The most one can hope to achieve is a temporary solution for a particular 
time or place.
The other line of thought leaks from Heraclitus to the 
pragmatism of Machiavelli, with its emphasis on good statecraft 
rather than on implementing grand schemes. Philosophers of this
school tend to appear as apologists for ongoing events. In fact
they are not chiefly apologists as much as possessors of a lively 
sense of the limitations imposed by their subject matter.
Parmenides, in contrast to this, taught that whatever is, is; 
what is not, is not. He demoted sense experience as a source of 
reference since something that is becoming, is not, and therefore has 
no being. (This is such a solid, uncompromising statement it is hard 
to see what politics could flow from it.)
But the person Nietzsche really gets excited about is 
Anaxogoras. (Russell dismisses him as ’not in the first grade’ thus 
allowing his cool scientific consciousness to interfere with and suppress 
his imagination.)
Anaxagoras held that primal matter is composed of elements of
all things. Like attracts like, and a thing is made of, or is, what
it is because it has a preponderence of one sort of element in it. 
Animating this matter is 'nous’ - a problematic concept. It is eternal 
spirit moving among a chaos of essences and, most important, it is free. 
Free that is to choose to move these essences in some way, which 
Anaxagoras envisages as a spiral.
It has to bea spiral to account for the physical arrangement 
of the universe (on 'an all-embracing centrifugal principle, various 
sorts of things separate out to form the cosmos as we know it) On 
another level, it has to be a spiral or else the motion engendered by 
'nous' would not be eternal, and we are supposed to be constantly moving 
towards that state where all the original elements separate out and join 
up with their similar elements.
Apart from the marvellous architectonic nature of this vision, 
which is the epitome of political theory, seeing as it does an order 
engendered by the nature of the things to be ordered, and yet achieved 
in the simplest and most elegant way; the exciting thing about it is its
status. This, Nietzsche suggests, is that of a game. ’Nous’ has 
been criticised as a notion because it appears as an uncaused cause, 
but is not supported by a supposition about any sort of divine being, 
or supernatural agent. This however is to miss the point of the 
description, which is that ’nous’ enters on its ordering activities 
as if playing a game. There was no compulsion on it to act in a certain 
way. Events are not linked in causal chains of uncompromising 
regularity, and this is in fact our political experience.
Anaxagoras was a genius to combine both this and the simplicity of the 
helical movement in one theory, for it possesses a stark simplicity and 
necessity combined with an appreciation of the diverse nature of its 
subject matter.
The theory of Anaxagoras is akin to a myth. Its logical 
counterpart in more self-conscious theorising of modem times is Hobbes’ 
theory which, starting from mechanical motion, moves through psychology 
to political theory. But by the time Hobbes is writing, mythic overtones 
have been entirely abandoned, and consequently his theory says at once 
less and more than Anaxagoras’. It says more because it goes into 
details of particular fields, in a sense defining their subject matter 
and prescribing methods of reducing it to coherence. It says less 
because it has forfeited, for depth, the marvellous simplicity of the 
earlier explanation, tracing surely the unity of all things, and making 
the very mode of explanation expressive. In Nietzsche’s words (52)
"Nous has no duty and hence no purpose or goal which it would be forced 
to pursue. Having once started with its motion, and thus having set 
itself a goal, it would b e ........a game."
The question of the wherefore of motion and its reasonable 
purpose thus just do not arise. Exemplification of this motion is 
Pericles, in his robes as statesman and citizen. He moves calmly 
and fully through and in the realm of human experience, accepting and 
transforming it according to the rules inherent in its material.
Anaxagoras with his description of ’nous’ and its ordering of chaos 
draws a picture of the whole of -the whole tha,t human activity is 
directed towards, and a part of. In contrast to this, Hobbes' plan 
is disjointed at best.
In Socrates and Plato this sense of the game of politics is lost. 
Systematisation becomes the thing and must be carried out in deadly 
seriousness. The watershed in political thought thus reached has been 
dealt with variously by political philosophers. Their views differ, 
but they are united in seeing Plato’s work, (especially the Republic) 
as of the utmost significance in the history of political thought.
It is almost a cliche that thought in presocratic times was 
universal: no distinction as we know it was made between such things
as science and philosophy. There were further differences in the 
extent to which ’mind’ and ’will’ were utilised. The Greeks applied 
them much more liberally than we do now, investing nature, as well as 
people with mental attributes. It follows that their explanations of 
certain events were different from our own.
However, this lack of differentiation was not due to simple- 
mindedness on the part of the Greeks. Par from it. It was an attempt 
to produce, in the area now labelled philosophy, an explanation which 
contained a good deal of poetry.
Now why should this occur? It is something which Plato, at 
the birth of conceptualisation, avoids; and which we, following Plato 
have also avoided. The characteristic which above all others in 
presocratic thought seems strange to thinkers in the western philosophic 
tradition, is not its lack of selectivity, but the kind ofexplanation 
used, and. its depth.
Wolin and Gunnell attempt to explicate this phenomenon, by 
introducing the notions of political space and political time (respectively). 
The history of political thought can then be interpreted as an exploration 
and extension of one of these ideas. At certain points, the old 
explanation cannot account for the phenomena experienced, so a new 
explanation is called for. This is produced by unravelling a previously 
disordered part of our experience, and grafting it on to the ordered part, 
in accordance with certain rules, supplied by consideration of the nature 
of the material in use.
At certain times the whole structure becomes too cumbersome 
to be workable, and at such critical jjoints, a radically new pattern 
is created, still taking account of the kind of material being ordered. 
Plato stands at one such critical point. Both Wolin and Gunnell see 
myth as a fundamental part of material to be ordered; experience 
existing in some primordial state. Frankfort says that "myth 
underpins the chaos of experienced
It does this by forming a theoretical bridge between human 
order and the order of nature. For instance, the Mesopotamian Ziggurats 
were built to close the physical gap between the earth, home of men, 
and the heavens, home of gods. The King, whose pals.ce they formed, 
by perpetuating the kingship, closed the temporal gap between men and 
gods and so fused the universe.
The creation of political order implies "a return to the 
principles of foundation or a regeneration of time by the imposition 
of structure on a chaotic condition*" (53)* Gunnell goes on to say, 
with specific reference to early Greek thought, that the breakdown of 
mythic thought pitched man into ’historical time’, and that in attempting 
to deal with this he, man, realised the importance of political philosophy 
as never before.
"Political philosophy was an attempt to find a home for man in 
the world once it became apparent that his time was not primordial time 
and the course of society did not coincide with the course of nature."(54)
Plato plays a pivotal part in the rejection of mythic thought, 
for when we reach Plato, this particular direct opening on the world is 
already lost. By discovering conceptualisation, we clamped-down a 
grille between our soul and the wide world that ever since we have been 
unable or unwilling to remove.
So we see as mythic thought breaks down, the emergence of thought 
about politics in terms of time. From here on begins the loss of the 
idea of the political as a means of mi-staining tlie individual against the 
time-ridden and necessitous realm of society. Time is used to explain 
certain features of political society, and it is a component, or to use
jargon, a variable in the search for order, which is a main preoccupation 
of political activity.
In much the same way, space, political space, crops up as 
an explanatory device, as myth begins to fragment. Space in the 
political sphere can be considered in two ways. There is the personal 
space of appearance; and the space of political influence with its 
intrinsic connection with action.
Hannah Arendt sees the space of appearance as the space of the
human condition. Our appearance is in the interpersonal space in the
web of human rela/tionships. Man qua man appears and confirms himself 
in action. That is, we understand what man _is when we see what he does 
(as opposed to what he makes).
Governments can affect the boundaries of this personal space,
and it is an image that points out the difference between, for instance,
a liberal and a totalitarian regime. In the former, the individual space 
is maximised, whereas the latter is concerned with a general space 
and not with the small contributions to it made by its members. In fact
individual space may be minimised in a totalitarian regime to make room
for the space of some artificial or’magic’ body such as the ’state’, 
though this is an oversimplification, and by no means a necessary 
happening.
"The only character of the world by which to gauge its reality
is its being common to us all, and commonsense occupies such a high rankc
in the hierarchy of political qualities because it is the one sense 
that fits into reality as a whole our five strictly individual senses 
and the particular data they receive." (56) This passage describes 
on the individual level, what the Romans were trying to achieve on the 
level of nations and empires, and brings us to the second sort of space, 
the space of political influence. By stressing that there was something 
common to all their diverse subject peoples, they succeeded in unifying 
the particular in the whole.
The notion of a political whole is one which unites the 
dimensions of space and time in action, as Gunnell? talking of the Roman 
Empire^echoes. "The need of an ordered space within which to act, 
create and give play to the power of the mind and the potential of 
action became important, and as with the Greeks, the very creation of 
such a space, a cosmos that would emulate the constancy and stability 
of nature, became a problem of human action.” (57) He argues that
these threads converge in Machiavelli, who put himself firmly in the 
world of action and demised symbols to explore it. Because he believed 
human passions could be directed, he investigated history and change, 
in order to create a permanent order, in a world conspicuous in its 
disorder.
This attempt to extract the principles of human action, to 
discern patterns in past actions and to synthesise them in a single 
creative act which will establish a permanent political space, is 
directed towards stability. Once again mythic symbols flood in.
Hobbes on the other hand, tried to devise a science of order, but also 
had to deal with the flux of history.
We have seen the symbolism of space and time emerge from mythic 
thinking, all in an attempt to solve the problem of order, which we have 
argued (Section IIi) is a constant feature of the political sphere.
What is the explanatory force of this symbolism?
Well, symbols are themselves forms of explanation, and they 
are frequently used in explanation. Symbolism carries meaning. It 
therefore contains an interpretative element, and explanation, we argued, 
is always in some sense interpretation (Section I).
Does symbolism have a proper place in politics, or should it be 
relegated rather to the literary and artistic world? This question is 
particularly pertinent to Metzsche’s account of the presocratics. But 
explanation must be in terms of human experience, and must appeal to 
human experience. It can have no other basis.
Plato saw this when he invented the myth of the gold, silver, 
and bronze people - a myth current at least as far back as Hesiod -
to play a part in his Republic. The part was not that of a brainwashing 
device, but an appeal to something familiar, as a ground for the 
introduction of something unfamiliar: an attempt to get the citizens
to accept the necessity,of different people doing different jobs for 
different rewards, and being ruled by philosopher-kings.
The myth was an explanation.
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CHAPTER V.
P A R A D I G M S  .
We have argued above (Section III) that explanation in political 
philosophy necessarily concerns explanation of human action. This argument 
involves us in problems about the connection between explanation in the 
physical and the human sciences. Special difficulties arise in trying 
to apply a concept of explanation derived from thought about the physical 
sciences, to explanations of human action.
Here A. R. Louch (58) detects a tendency in theorists to assume 
the problem takes the form of a dilemma. Either we accept that the 
appropriate account constitutes bringing the phenomena under some general 
law or other, discoverable perhaps by induction.. This case meets the 
need for wide scope and the possibility of prediction. Or else we must 
resort to some sort of 'hidden springs account1, whereby a factor, such 
as the "will", not available to so-called 'scientific' investigation, 
accounts for the source of the action. Those who assume the problem can 
be couched in these terms, assume, as a matter of course, that the alternatives 
offered exhaust the possibilities.
But neither alternative accounts satisfactorily for the often 
fad hoc' nature of the explanations of action we often given, and further, 
fully accept. For instance, the reply to the question "why are you humming 
a tune?" could be, "Because I'm happy", "Because if I don't I'll say 
something I'll regret", or "Ohi was I? I didn't notice".' We would accept 
any one of these providing it was plausible to us at the time, and in the 
context of which we asked the question. But they cannot be sustained 
under a general law, unless it is of astonishing complexity. The need 
for a very complex general law, with many exceptional clauses, as this 
would have to be, attacks its own foundations, because instead of simplifying, 
it makes the thing we want to explain, more complicated.
Is there any other possibility? Louch argues that there is.
The theorists who put forward this dilemma, have overlooked a third 
possibility, that "explanatory terms are frequently given a use, not by 
role or criterion, but by paradigm". (59) Paradigmatic explanation
enables us to see, not merely what happens, but also why it happens, 
which in human action is one of our main concerns.
Do we meet with paradigmatic explanation in political philosophy? 
Indeed we do, in more than one form. Curiously enough, considering 
Louchfs complaints about importing models of explanation from the physical 
sciences, one of the most interesting and instructive accounts of the 
use of paradigms in political philosophy is written by V/olin (60) on the 
basis of T. S. Kuhn’s description of the structure of scientific revolutions. 
V/olin puts the theme of his investigation in this way: "Are there other
conceptions of science and scientific progress (than the standard empiricist 
account) which present more striking analogies, not with scientific 
political inquiry as it is now understood, but with traditional political 
theory as it used to be practised?" (62)
Kuhn disputes the customary view of scientific progress as 
incremental advance made possible because scientists adhere to certain 
practises governing theorising. This, he says, is not what really 
happens. Communities of scientists are formed, each of which subscribes 
to a paradigm. They see their work in terms of this paradigm, and they 
defend it by excluding from their circle, anyone with 'heretical* views.
Thus their main work consists in exploring and applying the paradigm the 
community has adopted. This work is dubbed by Kuhn 'normal science!
But the cost of 'normal science' is the supression of novelty and 
investigation outside the defined fields, to be seen in the wide use of text 
books. Scientific text books generally present the views of only one 
scientific community, which may at a given time, be very large, and they 
present it authoratively. It is, and is not to be questioned.
But from time to time anomolies do appear. The close 'fit' between 
theory and fact which characterises hormal science', is seen to break down, 
despite the tendency to concentrate on the puzzles for which an answer 
should be forthcoming. The anomalies accumulate, until finally they cannot 
be ignored and provoke a crisis. 'Normal science' disappears and 
'extraordinary science' takes over.' A.new paradigm is adopted and in 
time institutionalised, and so in its turn becomes 'normal'. The old 
paradigm is discarded.
The account of paradigm change given by Kuhn is somewhat 
arbitrary. He says it can only be made on a basis of faith. When 
Wolin takes the notion of paradigm into explanations in political theory 
however, he proposes that a new paradigm appears in answer to a crisis in 
the world. Plato is a good example. He just wanted to enter public 
life as a politician, but seeing what happened when his friends came into 
power, despite their previous theorising, he was convinced not only that 
there was something wrong with the world, the way things happened, but that 
the crisis it provoked was immediate. Others who have had this sense of 
strategic crisis and produced paradigms to account for and remedy it, 
include Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.
"In each instance," remarks Wolin (63) "the theorist's response 
was not to offer a theory that would correspond to the facts, or 'fit'- them 
as snugly as a glove does the hand. Derangement in the world signified 
that the facts were skewed. A theory corresponding to a sick world would 
itself be a form of sickness. Instead, theories were offered as symbolic 
representations of what society could be like if it could be reordered." 
Plato's 'Republic', Hobbes society under its sovereign, Rousseau's, ruled 
by General Will, all these were visions of the possibility of political order.
Where do the anomalies Kuhn refers to, arise in political society? 
Wolin suggests we view political society itself as a paradigm, that we see 
it as a coherent whole constituting customary political practices, 
institutions, laws, a structure of authority and citizenship etc. This 
ensemble of practices and beliefs, and one might add, values, is a paradigm 
in that the society carries on its political life in accordance with them.
That is to say in newspapers and other media, society is pictured 
in terms of the paradigm. Arguments in parliament are directed for or 
against aspects of society seen in terms of the reigning paradigm, and laws 
in turn, refer to its structure, by enforcing certain types of conduct; 
the conduct which conforms to the particular view of society presented 
by the paradigm.
From time to time however, strains result from e.g. the emergence 
of new social classes or new facial patterns. Then the society either 
repressed the strain causing factor, which may die down for a while, only
to boil up again, or else it produced a new paradigm. Now traditional 
political theory, in particular political philosophy, has always been 
interested in possible rather than actual worlds. So it is generally 
from this source that major political theories spring. They correspond 
to the phase of extraordinary science Kuhn describes, and produce paradigm 
revolution.
'Normal political theory1, on the other hand, is concerned with 
the actual arrangements, of a political society, and is a matter of dealing 
with contemporary problems, often from necessity, in an 'ad hoc* way, 
but in terms of the dominant paradigm. Wolin hypothesises that when the 
'normal' phase is going reasonably well, it tends to be impatient with 
philosophy, v/hich by its nature re-opens 'closed' questions, and to lay 
much more stress on behavioural theory, in an attempt to understand what 
'is' in terms of the current paradigm.
This is a very interesting thesis and enables us to look at major 
political theorists as promulgators of paradigms, giving us a new way of 
looking at the political world; specified distinctive methods of inquiry 
into this world; provided new definitions of what was significant for 
our understanding of that world; and provided, an implicit or explicit 
statement of v/hat should count as an answer to certain basic political 
questions. It may be summed up in Wolin's own words. (6k)
"In pointing to the unique status of certain major political theories,
I am not suggesting that the latter writers merely borrowed from them or 
were influenced by them. The point is more substantial, namely that 
major theories have served as master-paradigms enabling later and lesser 
writers to exploit them in a manner comparable to 'normal science'."
The investigation of the paradigm at the root of a particular 
society's organisation and view of itself, is something like Rosen's concept 
of 'magic', although its adoption is not nearly so arbitrary. The two 
concepts play a similar role in explanation, because an important role of 
explanation in political philosophy is to expose these important and often 
only implicitly formulated concepts, so that their role can be evaluated; 
or perhaps, just so that we can understand the roots of a particular society.
The use of paradigmatic explanation depends on the possibilities 
of comparison between given facts and the paradigm itself. That is, a 
paradigm is an explanatory device insofar as it helps us to understand 
the way things happen in the political sphere. It has generally been 
the hope of the theorists who produced the paradigms that they have shown 
what should happen in that sphere.
For instance, Plato’s ’Republic1 contains assumptions about the 
abilities of human beings which we may substantiate from our own experience. 
It points out basis inequalities and adds the maxim, with which the Greeks 
of that period were familiar in the form of a myth, that potential is 
similarly and unequally distributed. We are born 'gold', 'bronze' or 
'silver' and cannot change.
Given this assumption, and the goal of attaining the Good insofar as 
it is possible, Plato proposes an operative paradigm of political society - 
the Republic. We are swept on from psychological generalisations, to a view 
of v/hat ought to be. Hobbes works in the same way, though being more 
fearful than Plato, arrives at the best v/e could hope for given the facts 
as they are. Still both paradigms entail presumptive viev/s of society.
We have detected paradigm change in the political sphere. Can 
we find any other of the features of the Wolin/Kuhn model? V/olin. suggested 
that strain in society corresponds to the anomalies that are detected from 
time to time in scientific v/orld. An argument that present day American 
society is experiencing strain in the educational field is put forward 
by Maxine Greene (65).
Advances in the application of technological discoveries are making 
great and constant demands on the adaptability of contemporary society. It 
is no longer reasonable to expect to spend ones whole life doing the same • 
job in the same way. Change in this field is becoming more and more rapid, 
and it is the educational influence exerted by society that can do most to 
enable people to adapt to this, to see in it a challenge and opportunity, 
and not a threat.
This is apparent in current thought on education, throughout which 
two motifs are repeated. Within the profession teaching is "Treated more
and more frequently as the deliberate, intentional activity many of 
us have conceived it to be: an activity entailing or promoting the
learning which generates thinking." (66) This motif is recognised outside 
the profession also, v/here it expressed in awareness of the current 
social emphasis on specialisation against a background of rapid change 
it results in demands for the creation of a 'learning society'. A, 
sooiety, that is, concerned v/ith practical matters, which sees the need 
to stress the place and power of education in equipping people to meet 
the challenge of change.
Thus the first motif Miss Greene identifies is an expanding one.
It grows from the notion of education as an activity to produce
ramifications in the world of thinking. The second motif is one of constraint.
Rapid change at any time leaves us v/ith v/hat Hobbes described as 
the "eternal problem of order"; and education is often seen as the 
solution to this problem. Here we move into the sphere of the political, 
into the necessarily turbulent v/orld of demand and counter-demand. Politics 
has to resolve conflicting interests v/ith reconciliation or compromise, in 
the interests of action. To control all this Hobbes required that power 
should be vested in the sovereign, and thus used to maintain the safety and 
peace of the state.
As. a means of ensuring this safety, the sovereign should inspect 
the curriculum, and act as censor. "It belongeth therefore to him that 
hath the sovereign pov/er, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions 
and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace thereby to prevent discord 
and civil war." (67)
This is an example of the repressive, second motif, to be found 
in educational thought, with its main concern consolidation rather than 
extension. It is present in doctrines which counsel the maintenance of 
the status quo, rather than advance to ’new ideas.
Depending on whether a society adopts one or other of these motifs, 
its administration v/ill give different weight to the several principles 
that could be adopted in running a school. In other v/ords, the prevailing 
paradigm affects, or even determines, the kind of educational institution 
provided by a society. This does not, however, enable us to evaluate them,
since their effect can be judged only from an existing ethical standpoint.
One is therefore led, in any discussion relating society, education and 
politics, to a consideration of values and ultimate moral principles.
This is because educational issues cannot be decided without 
at the same time, implementing educational values, and these values arise 
from the nature of the society in which we live; a society which we see 
in terms of a paradigm.
Consider, for instance, the changes in the British educational 
system wrought by successive governments on the basis of reports produced 
by committees the governments themselves set up. The members of those 
committees lived in the society they themselves were investigating.
Before a committee is convened, there must be some feeling or awareness that 
it is needed, that the issue it is about to debate over a period of months 
or even years, is arousing interest or causing concern; in short that it 
constitutes an anomaly to the reigning paradigm. Their recommendations 
should reflect their personal convictions on the basis of discussion, and 
within their terms of reference it is true, but convictions and terms of 
reference are socially based. Thus, at its source, education is enmeshed 
in society, and thereby in its paradigms.
Now, as a counter argument to the explanation just given, of the 
work of a government committee, Michael Oakeshott might argue that, rather 
than a departure from a paradigm, the awarenes of a problem sprang from a 
recognition of 'incoherence* in the tradition of that society. The terms 
are different, but is Oakeshott putting forward the same argument as V/olin? 
Is an'incoherence', the same thing as an anomaly? ‘
In this case it is not. A paradigm we have argued, is prescriptive,
it purports to be.picture containing all the desirable elements relevant to
A
its subject matter. It is a source of values. A.tradition, on the other 
hand, although it may be the vehicle of values, they may be embodied by 
it, is only an 'ad hoc' justification of these values. It is not enought 
to describe something as 'traditional' and leave it at this in political 
philosophy. Moore’s open question argument applies: we can still ask
"But is it good?"
We have outlined two differing motifs, both of which may be 
found in contemporary educational theory. If we regard the strain their 
existence places on our view of education in a social context, as anomalies, 
is there any paradigm which can account for the anomalies, or explain them 
in a new way, i.e. can we find an educational paradigm that resolves this 
strain?
We started to discuss the necessary connection of education v/ith 
social aims. These aims are directed towards producing a certain measure 
@6 conformity, so that each person may live in society, may even benefit 
from it•
But how is this degree of conformity to be established? Hobbes 
argued that the criterion is the safety of the state and thus justified 
censorship. But safety is itself a derivative concept. Is political 
stability at the cost of intellectual stagnation safety? Or does safety 
include some notion of the total well-being of the citizens of the state?
In the latter case, vigorous ongoing discussions of all kinds of issues 
could' be construed as safety, even if this led in some cases to civil 
disobedience or violence.
The anarchist argument, formulated by Herbert Read, (68) constitutes 
a paradigm which resolves the difference between Maxine: Greene’s two
motifs in education. It is couched in terms of man’s ’social nature’•
As long as man in society can act in accordance with his "essential 
biological nature" a harmonious society can reasonably be expected.
As soon as the constraints of society act against this nature all sorts 
of psychological tensions are set up in the individual, and society, a 
group of individuals, becomes sick.
This is an interesting viewpoint and throws light on Maxine Greene’s 
paper referred to above. She too, employed the concept of a 'strained1 
society and made the observation that this state of affairs existed at 
the present moment. Holding this opinion, she formulated the recommendations 
for educational policy that result from it. They are largely a plea for 
more participation in government decisions which involve educational 
questions by people who have studied the philosophy of education, or at 
least know of educational theory. This is to extend the relevance of
social aspects of such theory to the area of administration.
Read's concept of man having an essential, discoverable 
biological nature is at least as old as Aristotle. Besides further 
underlining the connection between theory and practice in education, 
its interest lies in the v/ay it is employed to introduce the social 
dimension of education. Moving away from the value-laden concept of 
the 'natural' thing, he considers the effect education has on the ability 
of individuals to live in groups, to participate in social activity, 
and concludes that this depends on how far they are able successfully 
to conduct their own lives. From this conclusion, he recommends the 
incorporation of an aesthetic element into educational theory. All 
this uses the social aspects of education as a starting point of over­
whelming importance, enabling us to focus on man's distinctive qualities.
The aesthetic element of education is introduced during a consideration 
of social organisation. Having pronounced that the western world at least 
is in a state of strain and tension, Read produces a strain - relieving 
recipe!a paradigm whose main ingredient is education. Much as Plato 
relied upon myth to organise the social forces within his ideal state, 
education is to aim at "creation of group discipline, of group unity or 
unanimity, a living together in brotherhood." In case this seems
too Utopian, or alternatively appears as totalitarianism veiled in net 
curtains, consider the aims of public school education that concern social 
rather than adademic ends. Read is in no v/ay creating an elite. Everyone 
is to benefit from the introduction of conscious consideration of social 
ends, which he thinks will be achieved through art.
As the child develops he is influenced by his environment. If 
this is as harmonious as possible, and in the theory we are considering, 
the appreciation of harmony around us can be accomplished fully by 
increasing the child's awareness of social phenomena, the child will develop 
'in tune' with himself, and therefore more likely to be in tune with 
his nature in both self-regarding and other-regarding matters. Hence 
the emphasis on what there is -to be learnt from art.
Perhaps Read takes too simple a view of the relationship between 
aesthetic appreciation of harmony in the arts, and harmony in the social
sphere. If so, this too was Plato's mistake. But whereas Plato used
it as an excuse for censorship to protect a static system, what may be 
Read
termed anarchy y''sees in it the justification of individualist values.
The essential social change here advocated is the acceptance of 
the idea of mutual aid. If help were freely and unstintingly given, it 
would be equally freely asked for and the need to set up official bodies 
to mete out v/ould diminish. There are all sorts of practical objections 
that could be made to such a simple theory, but if it were adopted, 
educational theories and values v/ould certainly undergo great change.
Perhaps the nearest approach to such a situation is that of certain African 
countries, where the tribal basis of social organisation means that 
everyone lives in a very extended family, and social inhibitions are 
overcome by ties of kinship, however remote.
However, the discovery of the need for the inclusion of an aesthetic 
element in education is not the only answer to the question of v/hy the 
social aspect of education is important. Returning to V/olin (69) we 
find that "each of us, as members of societies dominated by organized 
units, is part socialist,. part reactionary, part managerialist, part 
sociologist. Organisational man is a composite".
Organisational man is a phenomenon identified by the sociologist.
Our belief in his existence entails our consideration of his bearing on 
educational theory. If one becomes organisational man during and after 
leaving the institutionalised part of the educational system, there v/ill 
surely be repercussions on the institution itself, not necessarily in terms 
of recommendations for producing such wonders. No, it is possibly more 
relevant to consider the traditions such men embody and pass on and the 
values and principles they emphasize in paradigm form in order to ensure 
education is v/ide enough, stretched to cover all aspects of the social.
This width in education should encompass both the constraining, 
and the expanding motif in educational thought. Moreover the emphasis 
on the social nature of education running through Read's paradigm 
underlines a further function of paradigmatic explanation: highlighting
the connections between theory affecting various aspects of the political 
society.
REFERENCES CHAPTER V.
(58) A. R. Louch ’Explanation and Human Action'
(59) A, R. Louch op cit
(60) S. Wolin. 'Paradigms and Political Theories' in 'Experience 
and Theory' ed Parekh and King.
(61) T. S. Kuhn 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'
(62) S. Wolin op cit.
(63) S. V/olin op cit.
(6k) S. V/olin op cit.
(65) Maxine Greene 'Morals, Ideology and the Schools: A Foray into
the Politics of Education' in Educational Theory Vo. 17 No. k
(66) M. Greene op cit.
(67) T. Hobbes 'Leviathan'
(68) V/. Reichert 'The Relevance of Anarchism: An introduction to
the Social Thought of Herbert Read'.
(69) S. V/olin 'Politics and Vision'
CHAPTER VI
T R A D I T I O N .
These are often seen in a tradition, which notion itself explains the 
way we arrive at some political decisions, and embodies change in the 
area of the political.
The various sorts of explanation in political philosophy are often 
seen as part of a tradition. So v/e may speak of ’the Greek tradition1, or 
’the Western tradition1 of political thought, and mean by these phrases 
a certain set of ideas, values and justifications of action. To speak 
of a tradition in this v/ay imputes a common world view to those v/ho build 
it up, or by participating in political activity, reinforce the idea of 
the political, current in their society.
To designate a particular thing, event or object, 'traditional' is 
in itself to offer an explanation, or more correctly a justification of that 
thing. Most often it is political attitudes that are justified in this 
way. Thinking back to the description of explanation as attempting to 
increase understanding, the idea of a tradition is an explanation in this 
sense too.
But to be told, in answer to a question "why do that?" that it is 
traditional, or that people alv/ays have, may not prove a satisfactory 
explanation. It may indeed be the reason for performing that action, at 
that time and place, but it is not necessarily a good reason and there is 
the possibility that it is not the real reason for the action. Many things 
go on in the name of tradition which would horrify someone v/ho really looked 
at their implications.
But explanations become embodied in a tradition because of its 
nature. It is built up over time, and is a gradual accretion. So a 
collection of beliefs and practises sanctioned by custom and convention can 
be traced in all but the newest societies. find the nev/est societies such 
as Kibbutzim in Israel, or indeed that whole country, deliberately set out 
to create a tradition, in terms of which they can describe their corporate 
identity. This is particularly so in the political life of a community,
for with its preoccupation with order, it must have images, verbal and 
pictorial, in which to describe the order, which are common to all members 
of the society, and which point to the values it pursues. All this a 
tradition provides.
A, persuasive account of political tradition.has been provided by 
Professor Oakeshott(70) in criticism of the 'ideolog^style1 of politics.
By this term he means an attempt to deduce the direction of forthcoming 
political activity from abstract general principles, an attempt based on 
confusion about the nature of principles, itfhich must, he says be ’a posteriori* 
They are meaningful only after the event has taken place. They are 
generalisations from our experience. The only legitimate way to discern 
the trend of a political activity is to participate in it; to immerse 
ourselves in a tradition and so be able to pick out 'intimations* of its 
future course, with which current activity is necessarily pregnant.
He describes the way a tradition grows up, v/ith the formalisation 
of rules, which then acquire a priveleged status. Since he maintains 
that articulating a political theory involves abridgement of tradition, the 
role of a political philosopher is of less practical importance than that 
of the politician. The politician's job is to detect and resolve the 
incoherencies that from time to time disturb the fabric of tradition, 
and threaten the 'ship of state'. The politician is seen as a pilot.
The incoherencies are very widely defined, which gives this account 
of politics some of its credibility. The resolution of any of them may 
call for new laws, or new methods of administration, or even total revision 
of an area of government, amounting almost to a revolution. But the 
incoherencies must first make themselves felt. One could examine the 
proposed revision of the functions of the House of Lords in this light, 
or even more immediately, trades union reform, where incoherencies, in the 
form of unofficial strikes are only too apparent.
There are various implications of Oakeshott's view of the political 
tradition for politics and politicians. They spring in the main from his 
attack on Rationalism in politics. Rationalism in Oakeshott's view reduces 
knowledge to something that can be acquired by technique alone-.- It omits
the element of what would be called 'skill' if he were discussing a 
ball game, and which cannot be taught or formulated in rules, but which 
must be acquired by practice.
In politics the skill comes from being immersed in a tradition; 
from getting a grasp on the ramifications of tradition almost instinctively. 
Only then can the erstwhile politician see where incoherences have sprung 
up. And, equally important, only then can he discover the means to 
resolve them, that at the same time repairs the tradition's damaged fabric.
Political philosophers are left the role of apologists, since in 
Oakeshott's view they can write after the event only. So Locke, for 
instance is stuck with a viewpoint of the glorious revolution, and must 
see politics in these terms. It is hard at this point to decide whether 
this is merely a point of historiology, in which case it does not affect 
Locke's standing as a philosopher, or whether because he can only perform 
abridgement, the philosopher is necessarily thwarted in some way. Perhaps 
it is meant as a warning to Utopia builders, and empty headed impractical 
theorists, not to meddle in something they are not equipped to deal with.
But in this case, hasn't the role of philosophy as persuasion been overlooked? 
Articulation of a part of a tradition at a particular historical juncture 
may have profound effects on the tradition itself, and the same applies 
to the introduction of elements foreign to a tradition.
If this should all seem destructive, the philosopher can surely 
articulate, and perhaps save parts of the tradition for the next generation.
I think Oakeshott underrates the effect of rational argument on behaviour 
v/hich may not itself be fully rational.
His work is open to other criticisms, expressed by Benn and Peters,(71) 
v/hich should act as a deterrent to over-frequent and ill-considered use 
of traditional explanation. The faults of this mode of explanation spring 
in part from hypostaiization. As soon as v/e start talking of 'a tradition', 
we are tempted to look for a thing and characterise it, instead of limiting 
ourselves to the adjective traditional, and contenting ourselves v/ith 
characterising the events and activities it describes.
With specific reference to Oakeshott, Benn and Peters say that 
if the term 'tradition' is to embrace all possible sources of change and
influence on the political sphere, it has been so widely defined as to 
become meaningless. And to say that all political decision must be 
understood as takingpplace within a tradition, is to state a truism.
In Benn and Peter’s view, Oakeshott's opposition to acting on principles 
springs solely from apprehension about the effect of introducing sv/eeping 
changes, and a preference for gentle, piecemeal reform.
Moreover, Oakeshott maintains that general principles such as, 
one might guess, Barker's (72) Liberty or Equality, yield no specific 
prescriptions. True, say Benn and Peters, but this merely makes the 
point that rules do not determine the limits of their own application.
It has the disadvantage that, having made a rigid distinction between 
applying principles (bad) and pursuing an analogy (good) argument is 
discouraged. Analogies made explicit by the pursuit of intimations are not 
the sort of things one can discuss in a rational fashion, and so are beyond 
the pale of argument.
The way we are to go forward to political action, Oakeshott tells 
us, is by the resolution of incoherencies v/hich from time to time occur 
in the fabric of the tradition. But how are v/e to recognise the 
incoherencies? Benn and Peters rightly conclude that "Oakeshott’s 
suspicion of principles inhibits moral discussion because it rejects its 
procedure. But in refusing to appeal to principles he does not abolish 
them. He only leaves them inarticulate and immune to criticism".
The most damning indictment of such a traditionalist view of 
politics is that it can produce no rational claim for pursuing one course 
of action rather than another. It may v/ork in a society that is already 
a reasonable one, but this is contingent. It gives us no grounds whatsoever 
on which to criticise an unreasonable society, and thus "removes political 
authority and institutions from moral criticism and assessment." (73)
For instance it would mean justifying the introduction of votes 
for women, on the grounds that so much agitation had been made over the 
issue, that it was in the interests of political stability to introduce 
female suffrage. Now, though this might be. a very good argument for giving 
women the vote in England at that particular date, it is not the reason for 
giving women the vote, which rests on the implications of adopting a
representative democracy, the role women have to play in society, and 
other such consideration, including strong moral arguments.
To adopt this strong traditionalist, or we might say conservative 
view of politics, with consequent rejection of the role played by principles, 
is to rule out the possibility of evaluating political actions. It means
v/e cannot have any moral explanation of action in the political sphere, 
and this is surely not only incorrect, but morally wrong.
Be this as it may, traditional explanation, in a more limited 
sense, certainly describes how v/e do arrive at certain political decisions, 
in particular the ones that are not wholly rational. And since politics 
often concerns equilibrium between two opposing points of view, and has to 
provide a solution for the moment, it is often concerned with irrational 
elements.
Tradition also embraces irrational elements, so that when v/e come
to discuss a political tradition, we may do so in a variety of ways.
The way we choose depends on what we intend to do as a result of the decision
and so we use an appropriate language. As J. G. A. Pocock (7^ ) has
pointed out, we discuss political facts in several languages.
These may be more or less rational, and more or less coherent.
In a tradition, they may be all tangled up, and if v/e approach politics 
from a traditional standpoint, v/e accept that (i) there is an indefinite 
variety of these possible approaches, (ii) there is no fa priori1 reason 
for preferring one of them to the others,-and (iii) we can never~hope to 
rid ourselves of the simultaneous presence in our thoughts of more than 
one approach.
This does not mean, however, that we should not try to disentangle 
the approaches as far as possible. Some of the languages of political 
discussion are political reporting, commentary, literature, normative 
ones that we could call political morality, and manufacture of political 
ideology, theology and science. But political philosophy, as philosophy 
is different from all these.
Yet particularly in a tradition, to take up Pocock's point, 
philosophy in politics and history of politics tend to merge, in the 
attempt to make history of politics more intelligible. The abstraction 
from tradition this leads to, is an intellectual activity, aimed at 
understanding experience and environment, but it can never be complete, 
or the subject matter of history is lost: the relationship betv/een
experience and thought can no longer be investigated.
Philosophy provides one language in v/hich to discuss this relationship, 
and to understand political experience. It is a rational language, and 
to employ it v/e must disentangle the threads of a tradition as far as 
possible. Insofar as the threads are temporally related, v/e may use 
historical explanation in untangling them.
The emphasis in Pocock's account of tradition is on the possibility 
that theory can bear more than"one relation to action, from which it 
follows that any abstraction v/e do make from a tradition is an arbitrary 
one v/ith respect to the tradition itself. It is possible to abstract at many 
different levels. But the decision is not arbitrary in terms of its end.
We will not do philosophy by tracing the historical growth of an idea, but 
only by tracing its conceptual growth in a historical context.
On the intellectual level, the tradition does not itself provide 
the tools with v/hich to find its inherent patterns. We must make a prior 
selection of the area from v/hich we are abstracting. This constitutes the 
weakness of the traditional approach, because only by deciding on something, 
anything, can we begin to grapple v/ith traditions tangled threads. And 
only by encountering an indissoluble muddle can we tell that the intellectual 
tools we started with were too blunt or the wrong shape.
Its strength lies in its ability to provide a context for 
political philosophy, v/hich is not an activity within itself, but a way 
of bringing political experience under coiytrol, by defining it if necessary. 
Political philosophy, that is, does not provide its own terms or its own 
subject matter. It discusses things such as ’state1 or ’government’ that 
are in the 'real' world, even though it may discuss them in the abstract.
If the sphere of the political did not have an autonomous existence, there 
could be no political philosophy.
Such philosophy is found when "a thinker mobilises the principal
t
moral and metaphysical ideas known to him with the intension of bringing 
political experience under their control and explaining it by their means."(73) 
Now v/e have already looked at some of the ways this mobilisation of ideas 
is carried out in political philosophy. We may symbolise parts of our 
political experience, or incorporate it in myths. We may produce paradigms 
to make our point, or couch our political philosophy in principles.
Is the 'mobilisation of ideas' the same thing as providing an 
explanation? There are points of similarity. The use of ideas is not 
arbitrary. We select them with the end of increased coherence in view.
V/e v/ish to make things more intelligible, and may do this by setting up 
correspondence betv/een something we do not know and something v/e do know.
We may attempt to describe, using metaphor and analogy. We may analyse 
into constituent ideas. All these devices are employed in the intellectual 
process of political philosophy.
But is the organisation of experience always an intellectual 
process? If we must understand political philosophy in the context of a 
tradition, which is therefore open to many approaches, v/hat other processes 
can v/e employ that impinge on the intellectual one? At what other levels 
do we attend to our political experience?
V/e develop techniques and increase our skills in using them. This 
follows from a wide definition of 'political action'. We arrive at 
prescriptive statements, and issue them in the form-of imperatives. V/e 
increase our insight into political matters by discussion and persuasion.
V/e persuade and are ourselves persuaded. We increase the area covered by 
the tradition and assume it to apply on a wider scale, by seeing possibilities 
of understanding other things in terms of it. We are constantly amending 
our appreciation of the political.
Yet despite the great variety of ways of understanding experience 
a tradition supplies us v/ith, there are other v/ays of envisaging the sources 
of society. The existence of these ways are a necessary condition for 
the tradition to retain its meaning and significance of a source of change.
When behaviour comes to be seen as a complex series of interactions ar.iaing
from other different modes of behaviour "the social framework begins to 
appear the result or product of human actions instead of merely its matrix; 
a historical mode of understanding begins to replace a traditional one,
£nd what may be the most far reaching of changes in a society's style has 
begun to appear." (76)
Pocock's observation (above) is paralleled by Gunnell's description 
of the drop into historical time that follows the disintegration of myth.
Time now becomes a complex matter. It may stress either the continuity 
of the process of tradition or, on the other hand, the creative and 
charismatic origin of what is being transmitted. So now challenging 
traditions may arise within the same society and engender further political 
conflict on their own behalf.
The need for a vision or world view becomes apparent, in terms 
of which the tradition can be justified. The explanations one tradition 
provides may be balanced against those in another, and different approaches 
to political philosophy spring up, traditionalism being only one of them.
Thus, the area of the political changes from age to age, tending 
to include more or less of our lives. We tend today, for instance, to 
legislate on matters which Aristotle would have considered man's private 
domain, whilst what to his eye, would seem only a very small proportion 
of the members of a state actually participate in government.
The area we include in the political sphere is enshrined in tradition. 
When something is designated 'traditional' we are inclined to put up v/ith 
it (unless we are a revolutionary in which case our response is to do away 
with it) for far longer than v/e might do otherwise. The tendency is to 
resist change in the political sphere and thereby to promote order in the 
hope of safety and security, as Hobbes acutely divined.
But when change does come about, in political philosophy, it is 
not contingent change.
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CONCLUSION
Since the aim of this dissertation has been to explore the notion 
of explanation in political philosophy, there are no conclusions as such.
So instead, the main features which emerged are here summarised, with 
reference to Wolin's remark that "Political philosophy is not an arbitrary 
construction because its concepts are linked at several points with 
experience."
1. The area of experience to be explored was first outlined 
by the personage of Socrates/Plato, and western political thought has 
tended to follow the outline despite the fact that in writing about it,
Plato proposed conditions in which it would be destroyed. Philosophy 
concerning the sphere is preoccupied with the search for order in diversity, 
and for the good life, and has for subject matter man’s public activities 
and quest for patterns of living.
2. Explanation plays a multiform role in such political 
philosophy v/ith the general aim of organising experience and making it 
understandable. Thus it may appear prescriptive, justificatory, expository, 
clarificatory. It contains an interpretativeelement, and often involves 
conceptual model making. But in its most general aspect, it is concerned 
with understanding.
3. The connection between epistemology and political philosophy 
is highlighted by the need to find a starting point for philosophical 
thinking. This is always to some extent arbitrary, because of the way 
we start with the known and move on to the unknown, but the starting 
point is in the world of political facts, concepts and values, and so 
linked with political experience.
f^. With such a starting point in experience, some of the usual 
distinctions, e.g. between fact and value, form and content and explanation 
and its subject matter, are blurred in the search for meaning. Our 
experience is chaotic, as we receive it and to some extent determine 
it, by participation in 'the world', it can be variously interpreted, 
but not subjected to hard and fast distinctions. To make these rigid 
distinctions ignores our own participation in 'the world'.
3* Thus change in the sphere of the political, and the 
explanation found in it, is not arbitrary. It takes place with the 
aim of order in view, often order in the eyes of a political philosopher 
who is immersed in a crisis of his time. The order may be expressed 
in an explanatory parad:igm, v/hich connects matters of fact v/ith philosophy. 
Change in the created sphere of the political is linked with this connection, 
and from it springs the need for explanation in political philosophy.
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